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The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as the root-of-trust in a trusted
computing environment, and therefore warrants formal specification and verifica-
tion. This thesis presents results of an effort to specify and verify an abstract
TPM 1.2 model using PVS that is useful for understanding the TPM and verify-
ing protocols that use it. TPM commands are specified as state transformations
and sequenced to represent protocols using a state monad. Preconditions, post-
conditions, and invariants are specified for individual commands and validated.
All specifications are written and verified automatically using the PVS decision
procedures and rewriting system.
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In today’s society, with the use of computers and smart phones, we are often in
contact with people and machines that we have never seen – and likely never will.
Partly due to necessity, partly naiveté , we trust our own machine and that of our
correspondent. So what does it mean for a system to be trusted? We are often
aware of the security aspects of our interactions by having strong passwords and
avoiding suspicious links. However, trust is different from security. For a system
to be trusted, it must be able to strongly identify itself, operate unhindered, and
have experience or record of good, consistent behavior [25]. When it comes to
trust, we care about the participants in the interaction. A trusted system is
one that is predictable [31]. By this definition, however, a trusted system is not
necessarily a good system. But, once we have reliable predictions, we can decide
which of these systems we want to interact with.
At the heart of trusted computing [7] is the need to appraise a remote system
in a trusted fashion. In this process, known as remote attestation [10, 11, 18], an
external appraiser sends an attestation request to an appraisal target and receives
a quote used to assess the remote system’s state. To achieve its goal, the appraiser
1
must not only analyze the contents of the quote, but also assess the trustworthiness
of the information it contains.
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG), an industry initiative created with
the intent of developing trusted computing, designed the industry specification
for a hardware coprocessor known as the Trusted Platform Module [1]. The TPM
provides in protected storage of keys and measurements of data that report on
the state of the platform sent within quotes for remote attestation.
The TPM was designed to report on the state of its system using three roots
of trust: root of trust for reporting, root of trust for storage, and root of trust for
measurement. Each TPM has an Endorsement Key (EK) that uniquely identifies
that specific TPM. Building off of the assurance that the TPM is the only entity
with access to the private EK, the TPM uses that key as the root key of trust for
reporting system information. As the root of trust for storage, the TPM creates
a Storage Root Key (SRK), that establishes trust in the local platform. Within a
TPM, measurement refers to taking a cryptographic hash of the item to be mea-
sured. The root of trust for measurement comes from the trusted implementation
of this measurement with a hash algorithm [25]. With the use of these roots of
trust, the TPM can send remote attestation quotes and serve as a building block
in protocols implementing trusted computing.
As with any hardware or software implementation, the implementations of the
TPM have been rigorously tested to verify the specification has been correctly
implemented. However, with a system as critical as this, testing implementation
is not good enough. What we really need to know is that our trust in this design
is well-founded. That can’t be shown by testing. It must be proved.
This thesis shows the work we have done to formally verify the TPM. Specif-
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ically, we started with the TCG’s documentation that describes the data and
functionality necessary to the TPM. We have taken that specification and turned
it into an abstract model about which we can prove specific properties, most im-
portantly the correctness of the remote attestation protocol. We use PVS [27] for
our work, however the results and approach generalize to other tools.
To validate our work, we formally specify and verify a remote attestation
protocol – known as the Privacy CA Protocol [1] – using commands from TPM
version 1.2. Our objective is to capture an abstract specification from the TPM
specification, validate it, and use it to verify the correctness of the Privacy CA
Protocol. We are not making an argument for the protocol itself, we are merely
verifying this protocol as a part of verifying the TPM.
In order to properly verify the TPM, we have designed an abstract state mod-
eled off of the state of the TPM. We model commands that encapsulate how
the state is changed. We define pre- and postconditions as per axiomatic seman-
tics [20] for each command and using PVS’s proof techniques, we are able to verify
their validity. We use a state monad to pass modified state and command outputs
across a sequence of commands to verify properties of protocols of TPM.
We have successfully verified about 40 commands from the TPM command
set and several protocols dealing with key usage and sealing data. Our biggest
achievement has come in verifying the Privacy CA Protocol [19]. Our CA Protocol
steps through the role of the TPM in remote attestation and proves that the
commands return what they are intended to return. Additional theorems verify
invariants, postconditions, and detectability of various attacks. In the abstract
model, we are focusing on continuing verification of the full TPM command set.




Our work lies at the intersection of security, hardware, and formal methods.
Although no mastery of any of these fields is required to understand our work,
there are several areas that require some prior knowledge in order to understand
what we are trying to accomplish with this effort. These areas include the TPM
and related protocols, bisimulation, and our specification techniques.
2.1 Trusted Platform Module
The TPM [1] is a discrete hardware chip that provides cryptographic functions
at the heart of establishing and maintaining a trusted computing infrastructure [7].
The TPM’s functionality can be distilled into three major capabilities: (i) estab-
lishing, maintaining, and protecting a unique identifier; (ii) storing and securely
reporting system measurements; and (iii) binding secrets to a specific platform.
TCG’s specification of the TPM details 126 commands. Commands perform
functionality ranging from updating flags to sending complex messages. We will
model the state of the TPM and how commands change that state within PVS.
4
Although there are many parts to this, the most important to the TPM, and
therefore also to our purposes, are the roots of trust which ensure that the TPM
fits the requirements of being a trusted system. The Endorsement Key, used to
identify the TPM is known as the root of trust for reporting. The Storage Root
Key, a key for encrypting data, serves as the root of trust for storage. Platform
Configuration Registers are used to store measurements, the root of trust for
measurement, which are hashes of TPM configurations.
2.1.1 Keys
The Endorsement Key (EK) and Storage Root Key (SRK) are persistent asym-
metric keys maintained by the TPM. EK uniquely identifies the TPM and EK−1
is maintained confidentially while EK encrypts secrets for use by TPM. EK−1
could theoretically sign TPM data, but is never used for this purpose to avoid
unintended information aggregation. Instead, it provides a root-of-trust for re-
porting used in the attestation process.
As its name suggests, the Storage Root Key is a root key. The SRK provides
a root for data encryption. The data being encrypted is often keys, known as
key wrapping. A wrapped key is an asymmetric key pair whose private key is
encrypted by another asymmetric key. For example, if we were to express an
asymmetric key pair as (K,K−1), wrapping key K with the SRK would result in
(K, {K−1}SRK). Since the only way to get to K−1 is by decrypting using SRK−1,
the resulting wrapped key can be safely stored outside of the TPM. A wrapped
key may only be installed and used if its wrapping key has been installed. In this
way, chains of wrapped keys can be created, forming a tree structure with the
SRK at its root. Using the SRK as the root of these chains binds all of the keys
5
to the specific TPM.
To provide platform authentication while maintaining the privacy of the EK,
a TPM uses short-term Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs). AIKs differ from other
keys in that they are only used to sign specific structures within the TPM. Using a
certificate, a CA binds an AIK to a specific TPM without giving away the identity
of that TPM [2,9].
New keys within the TPM are typically created using the TPM command
TPM_CreateWrapKey. These keys contain several attributes including a usage
value, which tells the TPM whether the key is intended to be used as a storage
key (such as the SRK), identity key (an AIK), signing key, or migration key;
flags which indicate whether or not the key is migratable and volatile; and PCR
information (discussed in the following section). As mentioned, it is possible for
a wrapped key to be stored outside of the TPM. The EK and SRK are non-
migratable, meaning that they are never allowed to be stored outside of the TPM.
2.1.2 Platform Configuration Registers
A platform configuration register (PCR) is a special purpose register for storing
and extending hashes within the TPM. As its name implies, a PCR records a plat-
form’s configuration during boot or at run time. The TPM ensures the integrity
of PCRs and uses a quote mechanism to deliver them with integrity to an external
appraiser. Rather than being set to a specific value, PCRs are extended using the
formula pcr ‖ h = SHA1(pcr ++h). These hashes – called measurements – are
gathered in PCRs at various points during system operation, but the most com-
mon use is to ensure trusted boot. As each system component boots, images and
data are hashed, and each hash is used to extend a PCR. The nature of extension
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implies that at the conclusion of the boot process, the hashes in PCRs indicate
whether the right parts were used in the right order during boot. Specifically,
ideal PCR extension exhibits the property that h0 ‖ h1 = h1 ‖ h0 ⇔ h0 = h1.
The only way to change a PCR value is with a platform reboot or by using the
command TPM_Extend.
One unusual feature of PCRs is they can have one of two initial values. Re-
settable PCRs initialize to -1 (all 1s) while non-resettable PCRs reset to 0. Only
senter can reset PCRs to 0, allowing an appraiser to tell immediately if senter
was not called to initiate a measured boot process.
Using a combination of keys and PCRs, the TPM is able to seal data to a
state. This is done by encrypting a blob of data, and only allowing it to be
decrypted when the PCR values match chosen PCR values. A non-migratable
key, K, is used to encrypt a data blob. This key and the chosen PCRs are then
encrypted by a binding key, BK. The resulting structure can is represented by:
({Data}K , {K,PCRs}BK). Unsealing this data occurs when the current state
PCR values match up with the PCRs encrypted by BK. This process of sealing
data to the state is important for ensuring the PCRs values used are actually
those stored in the TPM [1].
2.2 Protocols
As TPM operations often require multiple commands, it is an important part
of TPM verification to verify command sequences, or protocols. If the TPM
commands are correct, then sequencing them should result in correct protocols in
addition to verifying the protocols themselves. In the actual hardware, protocols
are executed simply by running the commands one after another. In our abstract
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model, protocol execution is modeled using a state monad [26,33] to thread states
through a sequence of TPM command executions.
The TPM is designed to be maximally flexible, meaning there is no set defini-
tion of what these protocols should be. Very few of the TPM commands do some-
thing that we want in isolation. For example, the command TPM_CreateWrapKey
creates a key, and the command TPM_LoadKey2 loads a key. There is no reason
to create a key that will not be loaded, and it is impossible to load a key that
has not been created. Therefore, it is obvious that these commands should be run
sequentially. The most important protocol to our work thus far is the Privacy CA
Remote Attestation protocol.
2.2.1 Remote Attestation
Remote Attestation using a TPM is the process of gathering PCRs and de-
livering them to an external appraiser in a trusted fashion [16]. By examining
the reported contents of PCRs, the appraiser can determine whether it trusts the
system described. Using hashes guarantees the appraiser only learns whether the
right system is running and nothing more. Our remote attestation protocol uses
a Privacy Certificate Authority (CA or Privacy CA) that produces an identity
certificate verifying that an AIK public key belongs to a certain TPM using its
EK [1,9]. The Privacy CA is so named because it protects the EK while assuring
the AIK belongs to the right EK. This protocol is shown in Figure 2.1.
An AIK, wrapped by the SRK, is created using the TPM’s TPM_MakeIdentity
command and can only be used by the TPM that generated it. The command also
returns a CA label digest identifying the CA certifying the AIK, and the public
AIK signed with AIK−1. The AIK signature tells us that the AIK came from the
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CA−1 |}AIK−1 , {|n, PCRd|}AIK−1 )
Figure 2.1. Sequence diagram for the Privacy CA protocol.
right TPM since the TPM that generated the AIK is the only entity with access
to its private key. Using the public key embedded in the certificate, the CA can
determine if the entire certificate did indeed come from the TPM associated with
the AIK.
Although we are modeling the TPM, we also need to model the role of the Pri-
vacy CA. This interaction between the CA and the User is modeled by CA_certify.
The CA returns a session key (identified as K within Figure 2.1) encrypted by the
public EK associated with the TPM that claims to have requested the certificate.
TPM_ActivateIdentity attempts to decrypt K using the TPM’s EK−1 and re-
leases if it decrypts successfully. Finally, we are able to use the AIK to sign PCR
values using the TPM command TPM_Quote [1]. This quote is returned to the
User who can then send back to the appraiser the information that it needs. The
command CPU_BuildQuoteFromMemory simulates this final step generating for the
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appraiser an evidence package of the form:
({|{|AIK|}CA−1|}AIK−1 , {|n, PCR|}AIK−1) (2.1)
where: {|n, PCR|}AIK−1 is the nonce from the appraiser’s request and desired
PCR values; {|{|AIK|}CA−1|}AIK−1 is the certificate from a Privacy CA and public
AIK; and both are signed by the AIK.
2.3 Bisimulation
The approach we take for verifying the TPM is to establish a weak bisimula-
tion [30] relation between an abstract requirements model and a concrete model
derived directly from the TPM specification as shown in Figure 2.2. Both the
abstract and concrete models define transition systems in terms of system state









Figure 2.2. A weak bisimulation relation between an abstract tran-
sition system Abs = (S,Σ,∆) and a concrete transition system Con =
(s, σ, δ).
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We say that Abs = (S,Σ,∆) is an abstract model where S is a set of abstract
states, Σ is a set of actions on states and input, and ∆ : S×Σ→ Σ is a transition
on state and action. Similarly, we say that Con = (s, σ, δ) is a concrete state
where s is a set of concrete states, σ is a set of actions on states and input, and
δ : s× σ → σ is a transition function.
Obviously, since the TPM is a hardware chip, all data is stored and transmitted
as bits. The concrete model of the TPM will encompass such details. The abstract
model, appropriately is more abstract. It is significantly easier to verify properties
about the TPM from an abstract level than to work with the concrete specification.
Therefore, the abstract model was our starting point.
Eventually, we will relate the abstract and concrete models through an ab-
straction function, α : s → S, and concretization function, γ : S → 2s, which
must form a Galois Connection. However, the work reported here focuses on the
development, verification and validation of Abs for a TPM. In the abstract model
defined following, tpmAbsState corresponds with S, tpmAbsInput corresponds
with the abstract input, while executeCom andoutputCom correspond to ∆.
2.4 Assumptions
In order to avoid complicated algorithms that have already been verified in
their own right, we make several assumptions. We assume the hash function
is injective, giving the property SHA1(b0) = SHA1(b1) ⇔ b0 = b1. Although in
practice, hash collisions are possible, for our verification purposes, we assume that
will never happen. Additionally, we abstract away the details of RSA keys, leaving
only the assumption that all keys are unique and are unable to be hacked. We do
not yet attempt to model specific attacks on the TPM, we assume a Dolev-Yao [15]
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model for cryptography functions. Finally, though the TPM has a random number
generator, we are not interested in verifying the algorithm itself, merely that the
use of the results is effective. This leaves us with the assumption that the numbers
generated are random.
2.5 Verification Technique
To do our verification of the TPM, we use the verification system PVS [27]. De-
veloped by SRI, PVS is a specification language that supports an automated the-
orem prover. Fundamentally, it uses classical typed higher-order logic. Its built-in
types include booleans and integers, and uninterpreted types may be introduced by
the user. Type-constructors include functions, sets, tuples, records, and abstract
data types. Predicate subtypes and dependent types can be used to introduce
constraints. However, these constrained types may give rise to proof obligations
(called type-correctness conditions or TCCs) during typechecking, most of which
are discharged automatically by the theorem prover. PVS expressions provide the
usual arithmetic and logical operators, function application, lambda abstraction,
and quantifiers.
The PVS theorem prover provides a collection of powerful primitive inference
procedures that are applied interactively by the user. The primitive inferences
include propositional and quantifier rules, induction, rewriting, simplification us-
ing decision procedures, and data and predicate abstraction. We have designed
most of our proofs to use the catch-all procedure grind, that repeatedly rewrites,




Since no formal model of the TPM currently exists, our first task is to create
one. We are working with the precisely written specification provided by the TCG
for version 1.2 of the TPM. This section will show how we have abstractly modeled
the data and commands of TPM from the TCG documents. All code written can
be found in the Appendix at the end of this document.
3.1 TCG Specification
The TCG specification provides lists and tables of the data structures used
by the TPM [1]. For example, Figure 3.1 shows the TCG defined structure of a
sealed data structure (detailed explanation given in section 3.2). For each structure
defined, TCG includes an informative section, a definition, and a table with details
of each of the fields. Often these structures include fields (i.e. the field payload)
that provide a level of detail that we do not need to model. Our abstract model
seeks to capture only the functionality essential to the TPM commands, and
therefore is able to ignore such details. It will, however, be necessary to reproduce
13
these elements for the concrete model.
Figure 3.1. Example TCG specification - TPM SEALED DATA.
Due to the size limitations of the TPM hardware, many commands include
data on the size of the data it holds (i.e. dataSize). In our abstract model, we
completely omit this size information since we do not model this detail. These
constraints will also be included in the concrete model, but would provide an
unnecessary level of detail in our abstract model.
From the table of Figure 3.1, we can see from the type given that the data field
of the sealed data structure is a string of bytes. Taking a more in-depth look at the
TCG specification of any of the remaining types in Figure 3.1 (TPM_SECRET and
TPM_DIGEST for example), we see these are also structures constructed of bytes, as
we would expect from a hardware implementation. We wish, however, to abstract
away from the bit- and byte-level. Therefore, we discard implementation data
14
structures while preserving the semantics of its content.
3.2 Data Model
To preserve the semantics of the data structures of the TCG’s specification,
we define our own types for the TPM data structures. We model the same
TPM_SEALED_DATA shown in Figure 3.1 as the PVS structure shown in Figure 3.2.
For the most part, we keep the names of our PVS structures the same as those
from the TCG specification. Notice that the payload and dataSize are excluded







Figure 3.2. PVS abstraction of TPM SEALED DATA.
We have defined all of the data relevant to our abstraction in a recursive data
type called tpmData, a portion of which is shown in Figure 3.3. Within this data
type, we build structures out of other tpmData types and previously defined PVS
data types.
The tpmDigest type is our representation of the TPM_DIGEST. To perform a
hash of data, the TPM concatenates the values to be hashed and then takes
the SHA1 hash of them, represented as SHA1(d0 ++ d1 ++ ... ++ dn). In our
model, the tpmDigest is represented as a list of the elements that are to be
concatenated and then hashed. For example, this same SHA1 hash is modeled as

























Figure 3.3. Abstract data type for TPM data.
able to see inside of the resulting hash value so that we have to model neither the
actual SHA1 hash nor concatenation functions.
The tpmNonce and tpmSecret structures, while very similar in appearance,
perform slightly different functions. A tpmNonce contains a random value that
provides protection from replay attacks. We do not have a random number gen-
erator modeled, since we are not interested in verifying the validity of the random
number generation algorithm. Therefore, we model the uniqueness properties us-
ing a monotonically increasing integer value. When we create nonces, we will be
able to have a nonce count that we can verify never decreases, therefore never
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using the same nonce value twice. The tpmSecret is used as a plaintext password
to verify authorization. Since integers are easier to model than byte-strings, we
have also given the tpmSecret an integer value.
To understand the tpmCompositeHash and tpmPCRInfoLong structures, we
must look more in-depth at PCRs in general. Within the TPM, a TPM_PCRVALUE
is a special TPM_DIGEST type that represents a PCR’s contents. As explained
in Section 2.1.2, PCRs can be reset to values of either 0 or -1, or they can be







with reset corresponding to non-resettable PCRs (reset to 0), resetOne corre-
sponding to resettable PCRs (reset to -1), and extend representing a sequence of
values used to create the PCR value is maintained rather than calculate the hash.
The PCR_SELECTION is a list of PCR indexes (where order matters), and
PCRVALUES is an array of PCRs. We have defined PCR_COMPOSITE as the record:
PCR_COMPOSITE : TYPE = [# select : PCR_SELECTION
, pcrValue : PCRVALUES #];
where select indicates which PCR values are active, and pcrValue contains
the values of all PCRs. Within the TPM, a TPM_PCR_COMPOSITE would really be
a single blob concatenating only the values of the PCRs indicated by select, but
for our model, it is sufficient to leave the data in this record type.
A TPM_COMPOSITE_HASH is a special TPM_DIGEST that takes the SHA1 di-
gest of a PCR_COMPOSITE. Again, rather than calculate the hash, we leave the
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PCR_COMPOSITE directly accessible from within the tpmCompositeHash structure.
When it comes to PCRs and digests, we are not interested in implementing
actual hash algorithms, we instead want to capture at a higher level what the
hash is trying encapsulate. We are interested to know if we have captured the
correct elements in the correct order. Therefore, through our structures, we can
focus on the elements and their order without modeling the details involved with
concatenation of different data types or implementation of hash functions.
The tpmPCRInfoLong structure relates key wrapping or data sealing to a set
of PCRs. The current locality, the selection of active PCRs, and a composite di-
gest of the PCR values are captured as locAtCreation, creationPCRSelect, and
digAtCreation, respectively, when when the blob is created. Additionally, the
key or data may be bound to a specific selection of PCRs, releasePCRSelect. The
digAtRelease is the digest of PCR indices and PCR values to verify when reveal-
ing sealed data or using a key that was wrapped to PCRs. Using the wrapped key
or unsealing the data can only be done if a recalculated digestAtRelease matches
the stored version. Locality, as used with locAtCreation and locAtRelease, is
an additional security concept of the TPM indicating whether or not the TPM is
in an acceptable state to run a specific command. Locality implements a kind of
ring security model. It is not fully functional within our model, so for now, we
will consider it a placeholder.
The tpmKey structure represents an asymmetric key pair with additional prop-
erties used by the TPM. These include its usage, associated flags, and PCR infor-
mation for wrapping. Virtually all asymmetric keys used by the TPM are created
as wrapped keys. Thus, a reference to the wrapping key is part of the tpmKey
structure. Instead of modeling an actual RSA key, the type KVAL associated with
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all keys is an integer value that uniquely identifies the key. We use a positive
integer value for the public key, and the additive inverse of that same integer rep-
resents the private key. Integers were chosen as the representative value of keys
for several reasons: associated public/private keys can easily be identified, it is
easy to chose the next new key, PVS can easily induct over integers ensuring key
uniqueness.
The remaining structures are defined by composing the previously explained
tpmData. A tpmSessKey is simply a symmetric key. The tpmQuote structure, an
important part of the Privacy CA Protocol, provides the means for the TPM to
quote the current values of a list of PCRs. The tpmStoredData and tpmSealedData
structures are used for sealing and unsealing data. Notice that the tpmStoredData
includes a tpmSealedData structure, labeled as encData. However, this encData
stores a digest of all data from the tpmStoredData excluding encData itself. This
allows for the TPM to make sure that the data was not tampered with while
performing sealing and unsealing operations.
Most elements of our tpmData data type include a tag that shows what cryp-
tographic operations have been performed on data using the CRYPTOSTATUS type.
These functions include encryption, signing, and sealing. For example, a symmet-
ric key identified with k:KVAL and signed with the private key of idKey:(tpmKey?)
is expressed as: tpmSessKey(k, signed(private(idKey), clear)).
3.3 Abstract State
The abstract state is modeled after the TPM’s various state structures that
manage the internal data stored by the TPM. The TPM manages state by main-
taining several data fields and flags. We use a PVS record structure, referred to
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as tpmAbsState and shown in Figure 3.4, to maintain an abstract view of this
state as well as the memory associated with the environment where the TPM is
being run. The elements most relevant to our verification include srk, ek, pcrs,
and memory.
tpmAbsState : TYPE =















Figure 3.4. Abstract TPM and system state record data structure.
The memory is not part of the actual TPM, but represents the memory used
by the TPM’s environment for storing values. This is necessary for our model due
to our method of command sequencing discussed in section 3.5.
The srk and the ek represent the asymmetric keys SRK and EK used by the
TPM as roots of trust previously discussed in section 2.1.1. keyGenCnt is used to
simulate key generation. Each time a key is created, keyGenCnt is incremented,
providing a unique integer to be assigned to each key. These keys, upon being
loaded into the TPM are added to the keys set. The pcrs field of the state stores
all of the current PCRs values.
The flag and data fields are broken down into the different ways the TPM
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resets data. Upon startup, the TPM specifies what type of startup is occuring -
the TPM is starting from a clean state (ST_CLEAR); the TPM is starting from a
saved state (ST_STATE); or the TPM is to startup and set the deactivated flag to
true (ST_DEACTIVATED). The permFlags and permData store permanent data that
is not affected by any startup command; stanyFlags and stanyData are reset
upon any of the three startup commands; and stclearFlags and stclearData
are reset on each ST_CLEAR command. The ek and srk are part of permData
within the TPM. pcrs fall under stclearData.
3.4 Command Definitions
The TCG specification describes TPM commands by providing a table of com-
mand inputs, a table of command outputs, and a step-by-step description of what
the command does upon execution. We model this by defining a state transfor-
mation over the TPM state.
3.4.1 Command Inputs
Figure 3.5 shows the table of input values for the command TPM_Extend, the
command used to extend a PCR. Each TPM command has such a table including
the type, name, and description of all of the input parameters.
To translate these tables into our abstract model, we extract the relevant data
and pass that data as parameters to the command. The TPM_Extend command
is translated as: ABS Extend(pcrNum : PCRINDEX, d : HV) : ABS Extend?, where d
corresponds to inDigest and pcrNum corresponds to the extended PCR number.
Each TPM_Command implemented has a corresponding ABS_Command within
the tpmAbsInput data structure, as shown in Figure 3.6. Within the tpmAbsInput
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Figure 3.5. Example of command input - TPM Extend.
data structure, the arguments to each command are abstract representations of
the actual TPM data formats, which typically come from the tpmData data type.
This is appropriate for an abstract model where we are capturing functionality,
not implementation. Some bit-level details are abstracted away when they do not
contribute to verifying the basic functionality of the device.
Including all abstracted commands within the tpmAbsInput datatype gives us
an induction principle for the command set that is automatically usable by PVS
to quantify over all possible TPM commands and inputs. This allows us to prove
things about state fields that are invariant over all commands (as explained in
section 5.2).
3.4.2 Abstract Outputs
Figure 3.7 shows the table of output values for the TPM_Extend command. All
TPM commands are accompanied by such a table which includes the type, name,
and description of each of the output parameters. Each TPM command returns

























Figure 3.6. Representative elements from the input data type.
run.
Figure 3.7. Example of command output - TPM Extend.
Like inputs to the TPM, outputs are modeled abstractly using an algebraic
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type. Again we avoid the complexity of bit-level representations specified in the
TPM standard in favor of an abstract representation that captures the essence of




























Figure 3.8. Representative elements from the output data type.
The tpmAbsOutput constructs allow for each command to return the correct
output parameters as well as a return code. These return codes either indicate
success or a non-fatal error. Fatal errors from TPM commands are generated
using the OUT_Error construct, while non-TPM-related fatal errors are generated
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using OUT_CPUError. Since we are modeling hardware, fatal errors are obviously
terminating conditions. However, due to our command sequencing method (dis-
cussed in section sec:seq), these errors are merely propagated through to the end
of the command sequence. Therefore, it is important to note that these structures
are not part of the actual TPM, but are essential to our model.
3.4.3 Abstract Command Execution
Our technique for specifying TPM command execution is to define state tran-
sition and output functions in the canonical fashion for transition systems. Specif-
ically, we define the executeCom function as a transition from tpmAbsState (Fig-
ure 3.4) and tpmAbsInput (Figure 3.6) to tpmAbsState:
executeCom : tpmAbsState → tpmInput → tpmAbsState
and the function outputCom to transform tmpAbsState and tpmAbsInput into a
tpmAbsOutput (Figure 3.8) value:
outputCom : tpmAbsState → tpmAbsInput → tpmAbsOutput
Given s : tpmAbsState and c : tpmAbsInput, the output-state pair resulting from
executing c is defined as:
(outputCom(s,c),executeCom(s,c))
The executeCom and outputCom functions are defined by cases over tpmAbsInput
(Figures 3.9 and 3.10 respectively). Specifically, for each command in tpmAbsInput,
a function is defined for generating the next state and for generating output. These
commands are named within the specification using the suffix State and Out re-
spectively for easy identification.
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Figure 3.9. The executeCom function.
Since all TPM commands return at least a success or error message, all abstract
commands generate output, but not all commands modify state. In instances
where the state is not modified, the CASES construct used to assemble the functions
defaults to not modifying the state.
















Figure 3.10. The outputCom function.
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The TCG specification gives a list of actions for the TPM to perform upon
execution. Consider again the TPM_Extend command. Figure 3.11 shows the
actions the TPM is required to execute upon calling this command.
Figure 3.11. Example of command actions- TPM Extend.
At its core, the command TPM_Extend extends a specific PCR value. However,
the TPM must first perform some checks to make sure that the input values
are correct and that the TPM is in a state where performing this command is
acceptable. From Figure 3.11, steps 1.-4. perform these checks, while steps 5.-9.
carry out the functionality of the command.
The function extendState defines only how the TPM_Extend command mod-
ifies the state of the TPM:
extendState(s:tpmAbsState,pcrNum:PCRINDEX,inDigest:HV) : tpmAbsState =
LET L1=s‘stanyFlags‘localityModifier,
P1=pcrExtendLocal(s‘permData‘pcrAttrib(pcrNum)) IN
IF (0<=pcrNum<=23) AND member(L1,P1)




If the TPM_Extend command will throw an error – if pcrNum is not a legal PCR
number, or if the localityModifier flag is not set – then the state is not modi-
fied. Otherwise, the value of PCR pcrNum is extended within the TPM state by
inDigest using the helper function pcrsExtend.
The function extendOut, shown below, defines the TPM output generated by
the TPM_Extend command as defined in the TCG specification, shown in Fig-
ure 3.11.












The extendOut function first checks the error cases, returning an error message as
an OUT_Error. Otherwise, the function returns OUT_Extend where the appropriate
single PCR value is returned along with a return message indicating a successfully
executed command.
The commandOut and commandState (if applicable) are then combined to
make the entire TPM_Command using either modifyOutput if updating state and
producing an output, or output if only producing an output. TPM_Extend is






3.5 Sequencing Command Execution
In order to fully model a protocol, we must sequence commands in a manner
like assembly commands in a traditional microprocessor. Sequencing of TPM
commands is a matter of using the output state from one command as the input
to the next command. The classical mechanism for doing this involves executing
a command and manually feeding its resulting state to the next command in
sequence. Using a LET form, executing i;i’ would look like the following:
LET (o’,s’) = (outputCom(s,i),executeCom(s,i)) IN
(outputCom(s’,i’),executeCom(s’,i’))
We choose to use an alternative approach that uses a state monad [26, 33] to
model sequential execution. The state monad threads the state through sequential
execution in the background. The result is a modeling and execution pattern that
closely resembles the execution pattern of TPM commands.
To understand the state monad, let us first define a simple data type, State,
having a single field called state that holds a function from an abstract state to





Given s, a value of type tpmAbsState, and m, a State, the application
runState(m)(s) will result in a tpmAbsOutput, tpmAbsState pair. This is pre-
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cisely the output expected. Note that the use of State and state in this definition
is somewhat misleading. Neither is actually a state, but a state monad that given
a state will generate a new state. The data type should be viewed as a kind of
state generation or next-state function, not a single state. This is in fact the PVS
data type that we use to represent State.
Two functions must be defined for any instance of a monad – return and bind
(>>=). We will also define sequence (>>) command that is a special case of bind
commonly defined in most state monad implementations.
First we define return whose form is:
return(x:tpmAbsOutput):State =
state(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : (x,s))
where return lifts a member of tmpAbsState into State – given a tpmAbsState, it
returns a State that when run produces the original tpmAbsState. It is important
to recognize that the resulting value is of type State. This is not a TPM state,
but a state monad that can produce a state. If we extract the runState function
and apply it to a tpmAbsState value we will get the output, state pair that we
input. Specifically, runState(return(a))(st)=(a,st).
The second function defined for all monads is bind, typically represented by
the infix operator >>=. The bind operation takes a monad and a function from
tpmAbsOutput to a monad and produces a new monad. The implementation is:
>>= (m:State,f:[A->State]):State =
state(LAMBDA(s0:S):
LET (a,s1) = runState(m)(s0) IN
runState(f(a))(s1));
Keep in mind that bind does not produce a state. Instead it produces a state
monad that given a state, the parameter s0 in the above implementation, will
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produce an output, state pair.
The biggest clue to the behavior of bind comes in the LET form where (a,s1)
is bound to running m – the first argument to bind – on state s0. a is bound to
the output and s1 to the state resulting from running m on s0. If we were doing
this outside the monad, we would refer to this as the intermediate state between
the two executions.
The result of the bind is runState(f(a))(s1). First consider runState(f(a)).
Looking at the signature, f(a) is a mapping from something of type A to a monad
of type State. What we get, is a next state monad with the previous output
bound to a – the previous output is available to the calculation of the next state.
runState pulls the state function out of the new state monad and evaluates that
function with s1, the intermediate state. So, the state is threaded through the
evaluation with the user providing only s0, the initial state.
Another common operation is a specialization of bind that we refer to as
sequence (>>) is shown here:
>> (m:State,f:State):State =
state(LAMBDA(s0:S):
LET (a,s1) = runState(m)(s0) IN
runState(f)(s1));
Sequence works exactly like bind except that the previous output is ignored.
As a simple example of what we are after, consider the TPM command sequence









The TCG specification details functionality of 126 TPM commands. However,
counting only those necessary for providing functionality for the TPM (some are
depreciated, others optional), we must model 97 commands. We presently have
40 of these implemented listed in Table 4.1. Initially, we modeled the commands
that make up the main functionality of the TPM and those commands necessary
to verify the attestation protocol. Most of the commands that we have left to
implement fall in the categories of authorization, delegation, and cryptography.
4.1 Important Commands
Among the most important commands to the TPM is TPM_TakeOwnership.
The principle task of this command is to create the SRK, necessary for TPM
since it is the base key in the key management tree [7, 23]. The TakeOwnership
command functions check several state fields and flags, such as if there is already
an owner and the validity of the EK, before establishing the SRK.
An important functionality of the TPM is the ability to use asymmetric keys to
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Category Commands
Admin Startup and State TPM_Init TPM_Startup
TPM_SaveState








Protected Storage Commands TPM_Seal TPM_Unseal
TPM_UnBind TPM_CreateWrapKey
TPM_LoadKey2 TPM_GetPubKey
Migration Commands TPM_CreateMigrationBlob TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob
TPM_AuthorizeMigrationKey TPM_MigrateKey
Cryptographic Commands TPM_Sign
Endorsement Key Handling TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair TPM_CreateRevocableEK
TPM_RevokeTrust TPM_ReadPubek
TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub
Identity Creation and Activation TPM_MakeIdentity TPM_ActivateIdentity
Integrity Collection and TPM_Extend TPM_PcrRead
Reporting TPM_Quote TPM_PCR_Reset




Table 4.1. Implemented Commands.
seal and bind data. Commands such as TPM_CreateWrapKey and TPM_LoadKey2
create these asymmetric keys and enable them for use within the TPM. As men-
tioned in Section 3.2, public keys are modeled as KVALs, and their private coun-
terpart is the corresponding additive inverse. Therefore, creating a new key is
mostly a matter of getting the next integer value. Within the TPM, when a key
is created, the private part of the key is wrapped by a key. Each new key must
be wrapped with either the SRK or a key who can trace its roots to the SRK,
therefore creating the tree structure. Instead of modeling this encryption in our
model, we simply pass the identity of the wrapping key as a parameter of the
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tpmKey structure that is output after running the TPM_CreateWrapKey command.
Current PCR info from the state is also stored with the key.
Before a key can be used to perform any actions within the TPM, it must be
loaded. Since actually loading a key within the TPM consists of loading the key
data into the internal memory, we model this by adding the key to be loaded to
a list of KVALs maintained by system state.
After the key has been loaded, it can be used to seal and unseal data. The
TPM_Seal command performs encryption on the data input parameter. Addition-
ally, PCR values may be specified to be used in the seal [7]. In our model, this
encryption is modeled within the CRYPTOSTATUS of the tpmSealedData structure,
which is part of the tpmStoredData that is output from the TPM_Seal command.
The command TPM_Unseal performs the corresponding decryption of the data.
We have already shown that the TPM_Extend command extends a PCR value.
The TPM_Quote command outputs a quote, which consists of the PCR values
signed by a tpmKey. This is so the state of the TPM can be sent to a third party.
We model this third party using the command CPU_BuildQuoteFromMem.
The key used to sign quotes is an Attestation Identity Key. Identity keys
are used in lieu of an EK for security reasons to identify a TPM, and must
be certified as belonging to the tpm. The TPM_MakeIdentity command creates
an identity key, which is then sent with the certified public EK to the Privacy
CA [29]. Details of what specifically occurs within the Privacy CA are not relevant
to the TPM. However, we do know that the command TPM_ActivateIdentity
follows TPM_MakeIdentity, so looking at the inputs necessary to run that com-
mand, we know what the Privacy CA should output. This is modeled within
the CA_Certify command. CA_Certify signs a certificate for the AIK and en-
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crypts the certificate with a new session key. This new session key along with
the public AIK is encrypted with the EK and sent to TPM_ActivateIdentity.
TPM_ActivateIdentity decrypts this and releases the session key.
Two remaining commands that are not a part of the TPM, but are vital to
our model are CPU_saveOutput and CPU_read. These commands allow us to store
outputs of the commands in memory within the tpmAbsState. As previously men-
tioned, the memory is not part of the actual TPM, but is necessary for our model
due to our use of the state monad for command sequencing. These commands al-
low us to both write to and read from specific memory locations (stored as natural
numbers).
4.2 Command Predicates
Many commands require precondition checks to ensure either that the TPM
is in an acceptable state to run the command or that the parameters passed to
the command are correct. Since there are often multiple fields to verify, along
with making the commandState and commandOut functions for these commands
we additionally make a precondition function, command?:bool, function that
returns a boolean value indicating if the precondition has been met. The practice
of defining preconditions comes from axiomatic semantics [20] These predicates
can then be used within both the commandState and commandOut functions as
well as the proofs using these functions. The need for these command predicates
varies by the complexity of specific commands.
Returning to the TPM_Extend example, from the command actions specified
by the TCG in Figure 3.11, we can see that Action 1 should return the error
message TPM_BADINDEX if the pcrNum input is an invalid value. Additionally,
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Action 4 returns a TPM_BAD_LOCALITY error if the locality stored within the state
is incorrect. Therefore, the extend? command will return true only if these error
cases are not reached:
extend?(s:tpmAbsState,pcrNum:PCRINDEX,inDigest:HV) : bool =
LET L1 = s‘stanyFlags‘localityModifier,
P1 = pcrExtendLocal(s‘permData‘pcrAttrib(pcrNum)) IN
(0<=pcrNum<=23) AND member(L1,P1)
To use this predicate, we can simplify the function extendState (originally
introduced in Section 3.4.3) to update the state only if the predicate returns true:
extendState(s:tpmAbsState,pcrNum:PCRINDEX,inDigest:HV) : tpmAbsState =
IF extend?(s,pcrNum,inDigest)
THEN s WITH [‘pcrs := pcrsExtend(s‘pcrs,pcrNum,inDigest)]
ELSE s
ENDIF
An example of use of preconditions within proofs is shown in Section 5.4.1. As
previously mentioned, the command set implemented thus far minimally provides
us with the ability to model a full remote attestation protocol. Some aspects
of individual commands have yet to be implemented – for example, a level of
authorization using a concept called authData has been omitted since it is a further
layer of TPM security and not a necessity for remote attestation even though it is
an aspect of most commands. However, the functionality that has been modeled




To verify our requirements model we verify individual commands with respect
to their postconditions and invariants. To provide a degree of validation, we use
those commands to model protocols and verify execution results. While some
aspects of attacks are considered, we focus first and foremost on the correctness
of the protocol implementation.
5.1 Individual Commands
For each TPM command, we define postconditions and verify that our abstract
specifications meet those properties. For each command, we must show that given
any value for all parameters of a command, running that command produces an
output-state pair that satisfies the postcondition while not altering any invariant.
Returning to our example of the TPM_Extend command, we verify the postcondi-
tions of our command execution with the theorem shown in Figure 5.1.
The LET form runs the command starting from any state in the predicate


























Figure 5.1. Verifying postconditions of TPM Extend.
state is any valid tpmAbsState after the initialization commands have been run.
The pair (a,s) is the resulting output and state respectively. The remainder of
the theorem defines conditions on proper execution of the TPM_Extend command
including both error and success cases.
In some situations it is necessary to include an ELSE clause where there is
no possible output. Notice in Figure 5.1, there is a chance for the output to
be OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS). Recall that OUT_Error is not a part of the TPM
specifications, but merely our version of fatal error handling. Therefore, by our
own specifications, the concept of a ”successful” error being thrown is not possible,
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yet in some cases where we are forced to give an output, we use this. For commands
where this is a possible issue, we include another theorem that shows that this
case is unreachable. An example of this can be seen in Figure 5.2.
extend_post2 : THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),h:HV,n:PCRINDEX) :








Figure 5.2. Verifying postconditions of TPM Extend.
For the TPM_Extend command, if the inputs given do not satisfy the extend?
predicate, then an error message should be output. With use of a lemma that
different return codes have different values, we are able to prove that the output
of running TPM_Extend will never actually be OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS).
Single-command-based proofs are straightforward and were designed to be
able to be solved by using the catch-all strategy grind which repeatedly rewrites,
simplifies, and applies decision procedures. Occasionally, we must use the strategy
decompose-equality, which breaks down an equality where the terms are of
function, record, tuple, or a datatype constructor type.
5.2 Invariants
In addition to defining and verifying postconditions of each TPM command,
we also verify the invariance of properties that we wish to hold over command
execution. Invariants in the model take two forms - those that are explicitly
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defined and those that are captured in the abstract state type definitions. As was
previously mentioned, the only way to change a PCR value is by rebooting the
platform or using the TPM_Extend command. We can prove that this property
holds for our model using the following theorem:
pcrs_unchanged: THEOREM
FORALL (s:tpmAbsState,c:tpmAbsInput) :
not(ABS_Startup?(c) OR ABS_Init?(c) OR
ABS_senter?(c) OR ABS_sinit?(c) OR
ABS_PCR_Reset?(c) OR ABS_Extend?(c)) =>
pcrs(s) = pcrs(executeCom(s,c));
The theorem shows that with the exception of the commands ABS_Startup,
ABS_Init, ABS_senter, ABS_sinit, ABS_PCR_Reset, and ABS_Extend, the value
of the pcrs within the state, s, is the same before and after execution.
Notice that we have said that TPM_Extend is the only command that can
modify a PCR value, and yet we have mentioned several other commands that
allow these values to change. The ABS_Startup and ABS_Init commands set up
standard initial states following the startup command and hardware initializa-
tion, respectively. These commands reset all fields within tpmAbsState and are
therefore exceptions to all invariants. ABS_PCR_Reset is similar, except instead
of resetting all state fields, merely the PCR values are reset. The remaining com-
mands are the startup after reboot commands, which define initial states, and
therefore are also an exception.
Table 5.1 shows which TPM commands are allowed to change each of the state
fields. The field remains unchanged over all commands not listed.
It is interesting to note that while postconditions theorems are associated
with individual commands, the invariants are typically proven over all commands
simultaneously using the induction principle associated with the tpmAbsInput
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State Field (Invariant) Abstract Commands That Change Field
restore ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_SaveState
memory ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_save
srk ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_TakeOwnership,
ABS_OwnerClear, ABS_ForceClear, ABS_RevokeTrust
ek ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_CreateEndorsementKeyPair,
ABS_CreateRevocableEK, ABS_RevokeTrust
keyGenCtr ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_LoadKey2, ABS_CreateWrapKey,
ABS_MakeIdentity, ABS_certify
keys ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_LoadKey2, ABS_ActivateIdentity,
ABS_OwnerClear, ABS_ForceClear, ABS_RevokeTrust
pcrs ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_Extend,
ABS_sinit, ABS_senter, ABS_PCR_Reset
locality ABS_Startup, ABS_Init









stanyData ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_RevokeTrust,
ABS_ForceClear, ABS_OwnerClear
stclearFlags ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_SetTempDeactivated,
ABS_DisableForceClear, ABS_PhysicalPresence
stclearData ABS_Startup, ABS_Init, ABS_RevokeTrust,
ABS_ForceClear, ABS_OwnerClear
Table 5.1. Invariant fields from tpmAbsState.
structure. The previous invariant is an example of one such theorem - note the
universally quantified variable c : tpmAbsInput in the theorem signature.
Invariants on the abstract state are captured in the subtype defined by the
wellFormed? predicate. Specifically, the definition of instruction execution maps
a state of type (wellFormed?) to another state of type (wellFormed?). Con-
ditions in the wellFormed? predicate include basic structural properties such as




A collection of additional theorems verify detection of replay attacks, spoofed
quotes and nonces, and bad signatures. For example, using the following theorem,
we can show that a bad nonce, indicating potential replay, is detectable in the
quote:
bad_nonce: THEOREM
FORALL (s:(afterStartup?), k:(tpmKey?), n0,n1:(tpmNonce?),
pm:PCR_SELECTION) :




Additionally, we confirm that a bad AIK results in a bad quote recognizable in
the quote returned by the protocol:
bad_signing_key: THEOREM
FORALL (s:(afterStartup?), k0,k1:(tpmKey?), n:(tpmNonce?),
pm:PCR_SELECTION) :





Furthermore, we prove that the result of having different PCR values selected is
a different quote:
bad_pcrs: THEOREM
FORALL (s:(afterStartup?), k:(tpmKey?), n:(tpmNonce?),
p0,p1:PCR_SELECTION) :





These and similarly formed theorems verify that: (i) bad nonces, AIK signa-
tures and PCR values are detectable; (ii) PCRs record measurement order as well
as values; and (iii) senter was called to initiate the secure session. These are not
properties of individual commands, but of the protocol run’s output.
5.4 Protocols
Verification of individual commands is necessary, but it is not sufficient to
verify the TPM as a whole. Therefore we must also verify protocols using the
TPM. Protocol verification consists of sequencing command execution using the
state monad in order to perform complex tasks. While any commands can be
sequenced to create a protocol, some sequences make more sense than others. In
most cases, the commands sequences necessary for executing TPM protocols are
not expressly defined anywhere. Our model provides an opportunity for protocol
designers to check their work.
5.4.1 Basic Protocol Verification
Verifying protocols involves using the state monad to sequence command exe-
cution to perform more complex tasks. For example, if we create a key, we often
follow-up by loading that key into the TPM. Since this includes the use of multiple
commands, we can model it as a protocol. Figure 5.3 shows the verification of
this protocol.
There are several key parts to verifying protocols. First, the use of bind (>>=)
and lambda constructs allows one instruction to consume the output of the previ-
ous instruction. For example TPM_LoadKey2 uses the output of TPM_CreateWrapKey




LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_CreateWrapKey(p,k)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)

















Figure 5.3. Protocol used to verify key creation and loading.
for the possibility that the previous output is not of the correct type. We are
working on mechanisms for eliminating this, thereby cleaning up the protocol
representation.
The conditions for proper execution of this sequence of commands involve con-
ditions for proper execution of the commands individually, shown as the predicates
createWrapKey? and loadKey2?. The additional condition in the antecedent,
OUT_CreateWrapKey?(s‘memory(x)), is necessary to verify the memory was stored
correctly within the tpmAbsState. Although this seems obvious based on the use
of the CPU_saveOutput command, in order to satisfy all type check conditions,
this condition must be checked. In the consequent, we ensure that the output
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bound to a is consistent with the postcondition of TPM_LoadKey2, as it is the last
command in the sequence. In knowing this is the final output, we know too that
the previous commands were correctly executed (and therefore produced non-error
outputs). We ensure that the state bound to s agrees with updates made to the
state from all executed commands. For example, the field keyGenCnt is updated
by the TPM_CreateWrapKey command, keys is updated by TPM_LoadKey2 and
memory is updated by CPU_SaveOutput. However, since memory is not an actual
TPM field, we ignore the details of what is stored in the updated memory state.
5.4.2 Privacy CA Protocol
The most complex protocol we have verified to date is the Privacy CA Protocol,
previously described in Section 2.2. The protocol for generating and certifying an
AIK combines all of the previously discussed aspects of our model. Specifically, it
uses command predicates as antecedents to verify that a sequence of commands
results in the correct quote.
The PVS representation of the protocol from Figure 2.1 that generates the
output in Equation 2.1 is shown in Figure 5.4. To verify protocol execution, we
first ensure that for all inputs the output bound by the LET form to a is the quote
defined in Equation 2.1 and that the state bound to s is the correct state following
execution. This tells us the protocol generates the right output.
The TPM_MakeIdentity command is called, including parameters of d and k,
a tpmDigest and tpmKey, respectively. d can be any possible tpmDigest. k, how-
ever, is restricted by the makeIdentity? predicate to having specific parameters.
This key will be the newly created AIK. It may seem strange to pass in an ex-
istent key when we are trying to create a new key, but the TPM must specify
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ca_protocol: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?), d:(tpmDigest?), k:(tpmKey?),
n:(tpmNonce?), p:PCR_SELECTION, x,y,z:nat) :
LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_MakeIdentity(d,k)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)



































Figure 5.4. Protocol that generates full quote for external appraiser.
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the specific parameters of the key that it wants to create. Within the execu-
tion of the TPM_MakeIdentity command, this key will be modified to have the
properties of an AIK. TPM_MakeIdentity outputs this AIK, labeled k as well as
i:tpmIdContents, which contains the digest identifying the CA and the public
AIK signed with AIK−1.
This output is fed to the CA_certify command , which certifies the AIK,
called j, and returns it along with an EK-encrypted blob containing the di-
gest and newly generated session key, represented as d. TPM_ActivateIdentity
then receives these outputs and attempts to decrypt the session key. In order to
generate the quote, TPM_Quote uses the AIK (which it gets from the output of
TPM_MakeIdentity), a n:tpmNonce, and a p:PCR_SELECTION to output the PCR
values signed by the AIK. CPU_BuildQuoteFromMem weeds through all of the data
that has been generated and presents the quote defined in Equation 2.1.
Due to the number of rewrites required to prove this protocol, this proof takes
over 300 hours to run. Given the importance of this protocol, we must prove that it
still produces correct output with any major changes to our model. Therefore, the
time it takes to prove this protocol is impractical. To make proving this theorem
faster, we split the protocol into two parts, the first calling TPM_MakeIdentity
through TPM_ActivateIdentity, and the second starting with CPU_read and con-
tinuing to the end. This is a convenient place to make the divide since CPU_read
ignores the output of TPM_ActivateIdentity. We use the final state of the first
half as the start state for the second, giving us all of the necessary updates stored
within the memory.
Given that the preconditions for all commands involved in the CA protocol
hold, for any state that the TPM could be in after startup, we prove several things
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about the end result. First, a successful structure is output. This means that the
structure is a OUT_FullQuote type, with a CPU_SUCCESS return message. Addi-
tionally, the data within this structure is correct: a signed tpmQuote – including
the correct hash, and nonce values; the signed tpmIdContents containing the pri-
vate portion of the identity key. Finally, we verify that the state has only been
modified in ways that we expect. This means that the keyGenCnt has been incre-
mented twice, since an AIK was created from the TPM_MakeIdentity command,
and a symmetric key was created from CA_certify. The only other aspect of the
state that has changed is memory, which does not matter as it is not part of the
TPM.
Although the CA protocol is the crowning achievement for our TPM proof
collection, we have proved many other theories, named in Table 5.2. This table
omits the TCCs as many of them are automatically proved before we even look
at them. In cases where there is a second version of a postcondition theorem,
extend_post and extend_post2 for example, the second is typically proving that
OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS) is an unreachable case, as previously explained.
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PVS Theory PVS Theorems
key double_inverse, inverse_private, inverse_public, equal_inverse,
decrypt_encrypt, decrypt_equal_keys, no_decrypt_unequal_keys,
check_sign, load_key, child_if_parent, no_child_if_no_parent
pcr pcrsResetSelectCorrect, getPCRsCorrectness, antisym
memory empty_empty, update1, update2
StateMonad left_identity, right_identity, assocativity
tpm validatePCRs, check_validatePcrs, gen_quote, gen_cert, init_post,






















pcr_read_post, bad_nonce, bad_signing_key, bad_pcrs, check_PCRS,
quote_post, quote_with_prev_key, no_senter, pcr_reset_post,
pcr_reset_post2,




Our work is based conceptually on the work of Hunt [21, 22], Srivas and
Miller [32], and others in the hardware verification community. In a similar man-
ner, we start with a precise engineering description that is textual and graphical
in nature. From there, we construct an abstract formal model that we in turn
verify rather than verify the details. We assess the validity of our model by ex-
ecuting instructions in both the formal and informal models to determine if we
have actually captured requirements.
Most verification work involving the TPM examines systems that use the TPM
API [12, 24], not the command set itself. Noteworthy exceptions are works by
Delaune et. al. [13, 14], Chen et. al. [8, 9], and Gürgens et. al. [17]. Delaune’s
work examines properties of functions performed within the TPM using ProVerif
for their analysis. While we are attempting to develop an abstract requirements
model for the TPM, they focus on verifying cryptographic properties of TPM
functions. Their work deals with verifying authentication [14] where they examine
a command subset responsible for authentication. Two major differences are their
inclusion of session management commands and their decision not to explicitly
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model state change. We have chosen to defer session management thus far and
explicitly model state change using the state monad described earlier. In their
analysis of Microsoft Bitlocker and the envelope protocol [13], they include an
attacker while we are looking at functional correctness. These distinctions aside,
the abstractions they choose are quite similar to ours even though we are working
in higher-order logic in contrast to their use of horn clauses. This is encouraging
and suggests that developing a common TPM requirements model may be feasible.
It is also worth mentioning here that Ryan’s unpublished work [29] is an excellent
general introduction to the TPM and its use.
In their first work [9], Chen et. al. analyze the security of the Privacy CA Pro-
tocol, considering only cases that use uncorrupted TPMs. Their second work [8]
presents an enhanced version of this protocol along with its verification which
allows for corrupted TPMs. This work differs from ours in that it focuses exclu-
sively on the CA Protocol and does not handle any other aspect of the TPM.
Specifically, there is no model of TPM keys or storage protection. This is espe-
cially important when looking at what their model is trying to do in comparison to
ours. While we consider only the correctness of the protocol, Chen et. al. perform
extensive modeling of the CA Protocol in the presence of an adversary. We look
at the protocol implementation to ensure that it produces the structure that it
should, without considering specific attacks on the structure. We do ensure that
bad nonces, PCRs, etc. will be detected, but we do not relate these to security
issues. Additionally, this model differs in that there is no automation of proof.
Gürgens and colleagues [17] develop a TPM model using asynchronous product
automata (APA) and analyze models using the SH-Verification Tool (SHVT).
Their work shares several protocols of interest with ours – secure boot, secure
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storage, remote attestation, and data migration – with only remote attestation
being described in detail. Like our work they analyze interaction with a Privacy
CA, but unlike our work and similar to Delaune, Gürgens includes various kinds of
attackers in examining the protocol. Considering multiple attackers with multiple
intents is the most interesting contribution of this work. By using a automata
model, Gürgens also models state transition explicitly as we do, in contrast with
Delaune.
Protocol verification is a discipline unto itself and we claim no substantive
contribution there. However, protocols that use the TPM include work by Rams-
dell et. al. [28] and Backes [6]. Ramsdell et. al. have done work related to the
CAVES protocol using CPSA analysis techniques [28]. The objectives of this work
are substantially different, however it is worth acknowledging their complimentary
protocol analysis work. Similarly, Backes et. al. [6] verify protocols around the
DAA subsystem. Their goals are different, but again this work is complimentary
to the verification efforts we are pursuing.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
Overall, to verify the functional correctness of the TPM, we have written an
abstract specification, defined inputs, outputs and state for a subset of TPM com-
mands, defined and verified requirements for each of these individual commands,
and defined and verified several protocols. Modeling these main TPM commands
and proving properties of the Privacy CA Protocol has given us confidence that
we will be able to effectively model the remainder of the TPM commands and to
prove more complex properties of useful protocols.
Although we have modeled the main commands, we have modeled fewer than
half of the existing TPM commands. Additionally, the TPM includes the concepts
of session management and authorization, which ensure that the TPM commands
themselves have permission to run based off of the current state configuration.
This entire concept has been excluded from the commands we have implemented.
Additionally, the notion of locality within our current model does not contain the
full functionality that it does within the TPM.
As our model develops to be closer to that of a TPM implementation, we will
be able to model an attacker as well. This is paramount to verifying the TPM.
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Currently, most of our proofs are looking at functional correctness. In order to
truly verify that the TPM is a trusted platform, we must show that it is impervious
to any attacks. As with any attacker model, this will be difficult since the best
attacks are those that are unanticipated.
Finally, we will need to complete the concrete half of our bisimulation, as men-
tioned in Section 2.3. And importantly, we will need to perform the abstraction
and concretization functions that form the Galois connection. Without this Galois
connection, our abstract model has no credence that it is an authentic model of
the TPM.
Although the TCG estimates that TPMs have been embedded in in close to
one billion systems [3], few of these systems actually use the capabilities. The
release of Windows 8, which requires the presence of a TPM, is expected to drive
the use of TPMs to be more mainstream [4, 5]. With the growing attention that
the TPM is receiving, having a formal verification of the TPM becomes increas-
ingly important. Consequently, this verification of the TPM and its protocols
is imperative. Although the public sector is likely satisfied without such formal
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tpm [ B:TYPE+ % BLOB
, HV:TYPE+ % Hash value




% Assume that different blobs always have different hashes
unique_hash: ASSUMPTION
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FORALL (b0,b1:B) : hash(b0)=hash(b1) iff b0=b1;
ENDASSUMING
K : TYPE = nat; % key
RNG : TYPE = int; % random number
IMPORTING ReturnCodes;
IMPORTING startupData[B,K,HV];















































%% Cryptographic Functions (13)
OUT_Sign(sig:tpmData,m:ReturnCode) : OUT_Sign?

























%% Admin Startup and State commands (3)
ABS_Init : ABS_Init?
ABS_SaveState : ABS_SaveState?
ABS_Startup(startupType : TPM_STARTUP_TYPE) : ABS_Startup?
































%% Cryptographic Commands (13)
ABS_Sign(keyHandle:(tpmKey?),areaToSign:tpmData) : ABS_Sign?








%% Identity Creation and Activation (15)
ABS_MakeIdentity(CADigest:(tpmDigest?),idKey:(tpmKey?)) : ABS_MakeIdentity?
ABS_ActivateIdentity(aik:(tpmKey?),b:(activateIdentityBlob?)) : ABS_ActivateIdentity?






ABS_senter : ABS_senter? % implemented all actions as one senter










sinit : B; %% sinit blob instance for measurement
mle : B; %% mle blob instance for measurement
rand : RNG; %% random number
%% Initial key values not generated by TPM
ekKeyVal : K = 1;
srkKeyVal : K = 2;
caKeyVal : K = 3;
initKeyVal : K = 100; %% Initial key count value for initializing TPM







% Certificate Authority key
%% Abstract TPM State with keys, PCR array and locality
tpmAbsState : TYPE = [#
restore : restoreStateData
, memory : mem
, srk : (tpmKey?)
, ek : (tpmKey?)
, keyGenCnt : K
, keys : KEYSET
, pcrs : PCRVALUES
, locality : LOCALITY
, permFlags : PermFlags
, permData : PermData
, stanyFlags : StanyFlags
, stanyData : StanyData
, stclearFlags : StclearFlags
, stclearData : StclearData
#];
%% Well formedness condition for abstract states. Currently unused, but we




%% Define some common TPM states and state operations
%% Unknown state
tpmUnknown : tpmAbsState
%% Power on state after init is raised by hardware.
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%% Standard initial state following startup command with the TPM_ST_CLEAR
%% option set. Note that this should be checked against the spec before
%% asserting goodness.
















%% Generate a new state from restore data. Basically this is a clear
%% restart with pcrs, keys, and pcr flags coming from the restore
%% data. Note that this function assumes valid data and will behave
%% badly otherwise

















%% Predicate to determine if startup has occured. Used as types
%% (afterInit?) is the set of states occuring immediately after TPM_Init
%% (afterStartup?) is the set of states occuring immediately after
%% TPM_Startup
afterInit?(s:tpmAbsState):bool = postInitialize(stanyFlags(s));
afterStartup?(s:tpmAbsState):bool = NOT postInitialize(stanyFlags(s));
%% Standard operations on TPM state definition above. All such
%% functions end with State to indicate they operate on the state
%% value rather than on the TPM monad. Note that key set and pcr
%% manipulation functions are defined externally in key.pvs and
%% pcr.pvs respectively
%% Reset PCRs as performed by SENTER.
pcrsResetSenterState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘pcrs := pcrsSenter(pcrs(s),pcrAttrib(permData(s)))];
%% Decrease locality value
changeLocalityState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘locality := IF locality(s) > 0
THEN locality(s) - 1
ELSE 0
ENDIF];
%% Generate a new key
genKeyState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘keyGenCnt := keyGenCnt(s)+1];








THEN s WITH [‘permFlags‘ownership:=state]
ELSE s
ENDIF;








ownerSetDisableState(s:tpmAbsState,disableState:bool) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘permFlags‘disable:=disableState]
ownerSetDisableOut(s:tpmAbsState,disableState:bool) : tpmAbsOutput =
OUT_OwnerSetDisable(TPM_SUCCESS);
physicalEnableState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
IF not s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence
THEN s
ELSE s WITH [‘permFlags‘disable:=FALSE]
ENDIF;





physicalDisableState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
IF not s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence
THEN s
ELSE s WITH [‘permFlags‘disable:=TRUE]
ENDIF;





physicalSetDeactivatedState(s:tpmAbsState,state:bool) : tpmAbsState =
IF not s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence
THEN s
ELSE s WITH [‘permFlags‘disable:=state]
ENDIF;











ELSE s WITH [‘stclearFlags‘deactivated:=TRUE]
ENDIF;







setOperatorAuthState(s:tpmAbsState,opAuth:(tpmSecret?)) : tpmAbsState =
IF not s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence
THEN s
ELSE s WITH [‘permData‘operatorAuth:=opAuth
,‘permFlags‘operator:=TRUE]
ENDIF;





takeOwnership?(s:tpmAbsState,k:(tpmKey?)) : bool =
COND
i(s‘permData‘ownerAuth)/=INVALIDAUTH -> FALSE,
not s‘permFlags‘ownership -> FALSE,
not goodkey?(key(s‘ek)) -> FALSE,
not storage?(keyUsage(k)) -> FALSE,
migratable(keyFlags(k)) -> FALSE,
not RSA?(algoId(algoParms(k))) -> FALSE,
s‘permFlags‘FIPS AND never?(authDataUsage(k))-> FALSE,
ELSE -> TRUE
ENDCOND;
takeOwnershipState(s:tpmAbsState,k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsState =
COND
NOT takeOwnership?(s,k) -> s,




























ELSIF s‘permFlags‘FIPS AND never?(authDataUsage(k))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_NOTFIPS)
ELSE OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS) % Should be unreachable case.
ENDIF



























































disableOwnerClearState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘permFlags(disableOwnerClear):=TRUE];
disableOwnerClearOut(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsOutput =
OUT_DisableOwnerClear(TPM_SUCCESS)
disableForceClearState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘stclearFlags(disableForceClear):=TRUE];
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disableForceClearOut(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsOutput =
OUT_DisableForceClear(TPM_SUCCESS)
physicalPresenceState(s:tpmAbsState,p:PHYSPRES) : tpmAbsState =
IF member(LIFETIME_LOCK,p) OR member(HW_ENABLE,p) OR member(CMD_ENABLE,p)
OR member(HW_DISABLE,p) OR member(CMD_DISABLE,p)
THEN IF s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock
THEN s
ELSIF member(LOCK,p) OR member(PRESENT,p) OR member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN s
ELSIF member(HW_ENABLE,p) AND member(HW_DISABLE,p)
THEN s
ELSIF member(CMD_ENABLE,p) AND member(CMD_DISABLE,p)
THEN s
ELSE s WITH [‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceHWEnable:=
IF member(HW_ENABLE,p) THEN TRUE
ELSIF member(HW_DISABLE,p) THEN FALSE
ELSE s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceHWEnable ENDIF,
‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceCMDEnable:=
IF member(CMD_ENABLE,p) THEN TRUE
ELSIF member(HW_DISABLE,p) THEN FALSE
ELSE s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceCMDEnable ENDIF,
‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock:=
IF member(LIFETIME_LOCK,p) THEN TRUE
ELSE s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock ENDIF]
ENDIF
ELSIF member(LOCK,p) OR member(PRESENT,p) OR member(NOTPRESENT,p)






ELSIF member(LOCK,p) AND member(PRESENT,p)
THEN s





THEN s WITH [‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence:=FALSE
,‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresenceLock:=TRUE]
ELSIF member(PRESENT,p)
THEN s WITH [‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence:=TRUE]
ELSIF member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN s WITH [‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence:=FALSE]





physicalPresenceOut(s:tpmAbsState,p:PHYSPRES) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF member(LIFETIME_LOCK,p) OR member(HW_ENABLE,p) OR member(CMD_ENABLE,p)
OR member(HW_DISABLE,p) OR member(CMD_DISABLE,p)
THEN IF s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(LOCK,p) OR member(PRESENT,p) OR member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(HW_ENABLE,p) AND member(HW_DISABLE,p)
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)




ELSIF member(LOCK,p) OR member(PRESENT,p) OR member(NOTPRESENT,p)






ELSIF member(LOCK,p) AND member(PRESENT,p)
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)














resetEstablishment?(s:tpmAbsState) : bool =
s‘locality=3 or s‘locality=4;
resetEstablishmentBitState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
IF resetEstablishment?(s)
THEN s WITH [‘permFlags(tpmEstablished):=FALSE]
ELSE s
ENDIF






























unseal?(p:(tpmKey?)) : bool =
storage?(keyUsage(p)) AND not(migratable(keyFlags(p)))





















unBind?(k:(tpmKey?)) : bool =
legacy?(keyUsage(k)) OR bind?(keyUsage(k))











IF migratable(keyFlags(p)) AND not(migratable(keyFlags(k)))
THEN FALSE





createWrapKeyState(s:tpmAbsState,p,k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsState =
IF not createWrapKey?(p,k)
THEN s
ELSIF s‘permFlags‘FIPS AND (never?(authDataUsage(k))
OR legacy?(keyUsage(k)))
THEN s





createWrapKeyOut(s:tpmAbsState,p,k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF not createWrapKey?(p,k)
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE)
ELSIF s‘permFlags‘FIPS AND (never?(authDataUsage(k))
OR legacy?(keyUsage(k)))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_NOTFIPS)
















































loadKey2?(state:tpmAbsState,p,k:(tpmKey?)) : bool =
validateLoadKey2(state,p,k)=0
loadKey2State(s:tpmAbsState,p,k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsState =
IF validateLoadKey2(s,p,k)=0



























ELSE LET pubKey=tpmPubkey(key(k)) IN
OUT_GetPubKey(pubKey,TPM_SUCCESS)
ENDIF;







e:tpmData) : bool =





























rand:int) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF not storage?(keyUsage(parent))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE)
















%% Decrypts the input packet (coming from TPM_CreateMigrationBlob) and then
%% re-encrypts it with the input public key. The output would then be sent to
%% TPM_ConvertMigrationBlob on the target TPM.






sign?(s:tpmAbsState,key:(tpmKey?),areaToSign:tpmData) : bool =
signing?(keyUsage(key)) OR legacy?(keyUsage(key));
% Sign a blob if signing key isn’t aik
signOut(s:tpmAbsState,key:(tpmKey?),areaToSign:tpmData) : tpmAbsOutput=




createEKPairState(s:tpmAbsState,r:(tpmNonce?),k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsState =
IF goodkey?(key(ek(s)))
THEN s




% If ek doesn’t exist, create a new ek from keyInfo
createEKPairOut(s:tpmAbsState,r:(tpmNonce?),k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF goodkey?(key(ek(s)))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_DISABLED_CMD)




generateReset:bool,inputEKreset:(tpmNonce?)) : tpmAbsState =
IF goodkey?(key(ek(s)))
THEN s








i:(tpmNonce?)) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF goodkey?(key(ek(s)))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_DISABLED_CMD)










revokeTrust?(s:tpmAbsState,ekReset:(tpmNonce?)) : bool =
s‘permFlags‘enableRevokeEK AND s‘permData‘ekReset=ekReset AND
s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence
revokeTrustState(s:tpmAbsState,ekReset:(tpmNonce?)) : tpmAbsState =
IF s‘permFlags‘enableRevokeEK AND ekReset(permData(s))=ekReset AND
s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence

















readPubek?(s:tpmAbsState,n:(tpmNonce?)) : bool =
readPubek(permFlags(s)) AND goodkey?(key(ek(s)));





























makeIdentityLocality : LOCALITY; %placeholder
% Output a newly generated AIK. Note that a simulates the new aik.
makeIdentityOut(s:tpmAbsState,CADig:(tpmDigest?),k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF s‘permFlags‘FIPS AND never?(authDataUsage(k))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_NOTFIPS)
ELSIF not(identity?(keyUsage(k))) OR migratable(keyFlags(k))
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE)


































% Retrieve a key if a can be installed
% The cmd assumes the availability of the priv key associated with th identity
% The cmd will verify the association between the keys during the process.
% The cmd will decrypt the input blob and extract the sess key and verify




























ELSE OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS) % Should be unreachable case.
ENDCASES
ENDIF;
% For PCRS hashing is pcrsExtend instead of tpmDigest





%% Extend operation on TPM state
extendState(s:tpmAbsState,pcrNum:PCRINDEX,inDigest:HV) : tpmAbsState =
IF extend?(s,pcrNum,inDigest)
THEN s WITH [‘pcrs := pcrsExtend(pcrs(s),pcrNum,inDigest)]
ELSE s
ENDIF;












% Output PCR of given index
pcrReadOut(s:tpmAbsState,ind:PCRINDEX) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF ind > 23 OR ind < 0
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_BADINDEX)
ELSE LET p=s‘pcrs IN
OUT_PCRRead(p(ind),TPM_SUCCESS)
ENDIF;
% Output PCRs from a state as quote
quote?(k:(tpmKey?)) : bool =


























a=0 OR a=1 or a=2
check_validatePcrs: THEOREM






pcrResetState(s:tpmAbsState,pcrSelect:PCR_SELECTION) : tpmAbsState =
IF null?(pcrSelect)
THEN s
ELSE LET num=validatePCRVals(s,pcrSelect) IN
COND




pcrResetOut(s:tpmAbsState,pcrSelect:PCR_SELECTION) : tpmAbsOutput =
IF null?(pcrSelect)
THEN OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO)








dataBindOut(s:tpmAbsState,k:(tpmKey?),d:tpmData) : tpmAbsOutput =
OUT_Data_Bind(tpmBoundData(d,encrypted(key(k),clear)),CPU_SUCCESS);


















readOut(s:tpmAbsState,i:nat) : tpmAbsOutput =
s‘memory(i);
revokeKeyState(s:tpmAbsState,k:(tpmKey?)) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘keys := revokeKey(k,keys(s))];
restoreState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
IF valid?(restore(s))
THEN LET rs=restore(s) IN
(# restore := rs
, memory := memory(s)
, ek := ek(rs)
, srk := srk(rs)
, pcrs := pcrs(rs)
, keys := keys(rs)
, keyGenCnt:=keyGenCnt(rs)
, locality := 3
, permFlags := permFlags(rs)
, permData := permData(rs)
, stanyFlags := stanyFlags(rs)
, stanyData := stanyData(rs)
, stclearFlags := stclearFlags(rs)




% deactivate by going back to init. Not sure this is correct.
deactivateState(s:tpmAbsState) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘stanyFlags(postInitialize) := TRUE];
% save a value to external memory
saveToMemState(s:tpmAbsState,i:nat,v:tpmAbsOutput) : tpmAbsState =
s WITH [‘memory := updateLoc(memory(s),i,v)];
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%% What we want to generate with each command is a pair of type
%% [tpmAbsOut,tpmAbsState]. executeCom generates the the state
%% from a TPM state and command while the upcoming outputCom
%% generates the corresponding output. Thus, to execute any
%% operation, both executeCom and outputCom must be used
%% Run if TPM_Init has run but TPM_Startup has not
executeComPostInit(s:(afterInit?),c:tpmAbsInput) : tpmAbsState =
CASES c OF







%% Run if ABS_Startup has run after TPM_Init


































%% Execute a command on state generating a new state. Commands execution
%% should be blocked if startup has not run and postInitialize=true.





%% Run if TPM_Init has run but TPM_Startup has not
outputComPostInit(s:(afterInit?),c:tpmAbsInput) : tpmAbsOutput =
OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS);
%% Generate output from a command and state
%% Run if ABS_Startup has run after TPM_Init












































%% Execute a command on state generating a new state. Commands execution
%% should be blocked if startup has not run and postInitialize=true.





%% CPU Command Definitions
%% Requires use of bind








CPU_read(i:nat) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState): outputCom(s,ABS_read(i)));
%% Call SENTER
CPU_senter : State =
modify(OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState):executeCom(s,ABS_senter)));
%% Call sinit for initial measurements





LET theMem = memory(s) IN
















%% CA Command Definitions
%% Invoke the certification authority
CA_certify(aik:(tpmKey?),cr:(tpmIdContents?)) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_certify(aik,cr))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_certify(aik,cr))));
%% Assure the CA generates an appropriate cert from the AIK and Ek
%% proved - Wed Jul 11 13:14:11 EDT 2012
gen_cert: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),aik:(tpmKey?),id:(tpmIdContents?)) :











%% TPM Command Definitions - Note that all commands used by the TPM
%% have the TPM suffix to distinguish from operations on tpm state.
%% Commands thus far are defined as state transforming or output
%% generating. This does not exclude the eventuality of doing both.
%% No-op - not a real TPM command
TPM_Noop : [tpmAbsOutput -> State] =
(LAMBDA (a:tpmAbsOutput): state((LAMBDA(s:tpmAbsState) : (a,s))));
%% TPM is off - not a real TPM command
TPM_Off : State = put(OUT_Nothing,tpmUnknown);
%% Power up the TPM and hit the TPM_Init signal
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TPM_Init : State = put(OUT_Init(TPM_SUCCESS),tpmPostInit);
init_post : THEOREM
FORALL (state:tpmAbsState) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_Init)(state) IN
a=OUT_Init(TPM_SUCCESS) AND
s=tpmPostInit
%% Save the TPM state in preparation for restore at startup
TPM_SaveState : State =
modify(OUT_SaveState(TPM_SUCCESS),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState):executeCom(s,ABS_SaveState)))
%% Save state actually saves the correct information.
%% proved - Fri Sep 14 11:20:25 CDT 2012
save_state_post : THEOREM
FORALL (s0:(afterStartup?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_SaveState)(s0) IN
LET save = restore(s) IN
valid?(save)
AND keys(save) = keys(s0)
AND ek(save) = ek(s0)
AND srk(save) = srk(s0)
AND FORALL (i:PCRINDEX) :
IF pcrReset(pcrAttrib(permData(save))(i))
THEN pcrs(save)(i) = resetOne
ELSE pcrs(save)(i) = pcrs(s0)(i)
ENDIF
AND permFlags(save) = permFlags(s0)
AND permData(save) = permData(s0)
AND a=OUT_SaveState(TPM_SUCCESS)
%% Start up the TPM after TPM_Init
TPM_Startup(st:TPM_STARTUP_TYPE) : State =
modify(OUT_Startup(TPM_SUCCESS),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState):executeCom(s,ABS_Startup(st))));
%% TPM_Startup post condition covering three major cases: clear, restore
%% state and deactivate.
%% proved - Sat Sep 15 09:58:36 CDT 2012
startup_post : THEOREM
FORALL (s0:(afterInit?), f:TPM_STARTUP_TYPE) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_Startup(f))(s0) IN
LET save = restore(s) IN
CASES f OF
TPM_ST_CLEAR : s = tpmStartup,
TPM_ST_STATE : valid?(save) AND wellFormedRestore?(save) =>
keys(save) = keys(s)
AND ek(save) = ek(s)
AND srk(save) = srk(s)
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AND FORALL (i:PCRINDEX) :
IF pcrReset(pcrAttrib(permData(save))(i))
THEN pcrs(save)(i) = resetOne
ELSE pcrs(save)(i) = pcrs(s)(i)
ENDIF
AND permFlags(save) = permFlags(s)




%% Prove that the only command that can run and do anyting folling a
%% TPM_Init is TPM_Startup. If anything else tries to run, nothing happens.




LET (a0,s0) = runState(TPM_Init >> state(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) :
(a,executeCom(s,c))))(s) IN
LET (a1,s1) = runState(TPM_Init)(s) IN
s0=s1;
%% Prove that senter after power up results in reset PCRs followed by sinit
%% measurement.
%% proved - Tue Jun 12 15:31:12 CDT 2012
resetMonad: THEOREM
FORALL (hv:HV, state:tpmAbsState) :














FORALL (b0,b1:ReturnCode) : OUT_Error(b0)=OUT_Error(b1) iff b0=b1;
TPM_SetOwnerInstall(state:bool) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_SetOwnerInstall(state))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_SetOwnerInstall(state))));
set_owner_install_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),b:bool) :
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LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_SetOwnerInstall(b))(state) IN
IF state‘permFlags‘ownership




ELSE a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PRESENCE) AND s=state
ENDIF;
TPM_OwnerSetDisable(d:bool) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_OwnerSetDisable(d))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_OwnerSetDisable(d))));
owner_set_disable_post:THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),b:bool):
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_OwnerSetDisable(b))(state) IN
a=OUT_OwnerSetDisable(TPM_SUCCESS) AND
s=state WITH [‘permFlags‘disable:=b];
TPM_PhysicalEnable : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_PhysicalEnable)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_PhysicalEnable)));
physical_enable_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_PhysicalEnable)(state) IN
IF not state‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence




TPM_PhysicalDisable : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_PhysicalDisable)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_PhysicalDisable)));
physical_disable_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_PhysicalDisable)(state) IN
IF not state‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence




TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated(st:bool) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_PhysicalSetDeactivated(st))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_PhysicalSetDeactivated(st))));
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physical_set_deactivated_post:THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),st:bool) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_PhysicalSetDeactivated(st))(state) IN
IF not state‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence




TPM_SetTempDeactivated : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_SetTempDeactivated)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_SetTempDeactivated)));
set_temp_deactivated_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_SetTempDeactivated)(state) IN
IF not state‘permFlags‘operator
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_NOOPERATOR) AND s=state
ELSIF not state‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence




TPM_SetOperatorAuth(opAuth:(tpmSecret?)) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_SetOperatorAuth(opAuth))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_SetOperatorAuth(opAuth))));
set_operator_auth_post:THEOREM FORALL(state:(afterStartup?),op:(tpmSecret?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_SetOperatorAuth(op))(state) IN
IF not state‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence






TPM_TakeOwnership(srk:(tpmKey?)) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_TakeOwnership(srk))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_TakeOwnership(srk))));
take_ownership_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),srk:(tpmKey?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_TakeOwnership(srk))(state) IN
IF takeOwnership?(state,srk)











THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_OWNER_SET) AND s=state
ELSIF not state‘permFlags‘ownership
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INSTALL_DISABLED) AND s=state
ELSIF not goodkey?(key(state‘ek))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_NO_ENDORSEMENT) AND s=state
ELSIF not storage?(keyUsage(srk))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF migratable(keyFlags(srk))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF not RSA?(algoId(algoParms(srk)))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY) AND s=state
ELSIF s‘permFlags‘FIPS AND never?(authDataUsage(srk))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_NOTFIPS) AND s=state
ELSE a=OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS) AND s=state
ENDIF;
take_ownership_post2: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),srk:(tpmKey?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_TakeOwnership(srk))(state) IN
not (takeOwnership?(state,srk)) =>
not (a=OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS))
% To be used with commands that use clear command:
% TPM_OwnerClear, TPM_ForceClear, TPM_RevokeTrust
clear_post(s,state:(afterStartup?),a,af,at:tpmAbsOutput,p:bool) : bool =
s‘permData‘pcrAttrib = state‘permData‘pcrAttrib AND
s‘permData‘ekReset = state‘permData‘ekReset AND
IF p
THEN a=at AND s=state
ELSE a=af AND keys(s) = emptyset AND
s‘permData‘ownerAuth = tpmSecret(INVALIDAUTH) AND
s‘permData‘tpmProof = tpmSecret(INVALIDPROOF) AND
s‘permData‘operatorAuth = tpmSecret(INVALIDAUTH) AND













TPM_OwnerClear : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_OwnerClear)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_OwnerClear)));
owner_clear_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :




TPM_ForceClear : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_ForceClear)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_ForceClear)));
force_clear_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :





ELSE a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PRESENCE) and s=state
ENDIF;
TPM_DisableOwnerClear : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_DisableOwnerClear)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_DisableOwnerClear)));
disable_owner_clear_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :
LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_DisableOwnerClear)(state) IN
s=state with [‘permFlags‘disableOwnerClear:=TRUE] AND
a=OUT_DisableOwnerClear(TPM_SUCCESS);
TPM_DisableForceClear : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_DisableForceClear)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_DisableForceClear)));
disable_force_clear_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :
LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_DisableForceClear)(state) IN
s‘stclearFlags‘disableForceClear = TRUE AND
a = OUT_DisableForceClear(TPM_SUCCESS);
TSC_PhysicalPresence(p:PHYSPRES) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_PhysicalPresence(p))),
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(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_PhysicalPresence(p))));
physical_presence_post: THEOREM FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),p:PHYSPRES) :
LET(a,s) = runState(TSC_PhysicalPresence(p))(state) IN
IF member(LIFETIME_LOCK,p) OR member(HW_ENABLE,p) OR member(CMD_ENABLE,p)
OR member(HW_DISABLE,p) OR member(CMD_DISABLE,p)
THEN IF state‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(LOCK,p) OR member(PRESENT,p) OR member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(HW_ENABLE,p) AND member(HW_DISABLE,p)
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(CMD_ENABLE,p) AND member(CMD_DISABLE,p)
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSE s=state WITH [‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceHWEnable:=
IF member(HW_ENABLE,p) THEN TRUE
ELSIF member(HW_DISABLE,p) THEN FALSE
ELSE s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceHWEnable ENDIF,
‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceCMDEnable:=
IF member(CMD_ENABLE,p) THEN TRUE
ELSIF member(HW_DISABLE,p) THEN FALSE
ELSE s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceCMDEnable ENDIF,
‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock:=
IF member(LIFETIME_LOCK,p) THEN TRUE
ELSE s‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceLifetimeLock ENDIF] AND
a=OUT_PhysicalPresence(TPM_SUCCESS)
ENDIF
ELSIF member(LOCK,p) OR member(PRESENT,p) OR member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN IF member(LIFETIME_LOCK,p) OR member(HW_ENABLE,p) OR
member(CMD_ENABLE,p)OR member(HW_DISABLE,p) OR member(CMD_DISABLE,p)
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF state‘permFlags‘physicalPresenceCMDEnable=FALSE
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(LOCK,p) AND member(PRESENT,p)
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(PRESENT,p) AND member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF state‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresenceLock
THEN s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ELSIF member(LOCK,p)




THEN s=state WITH [‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence:=TRUE] AND
a=OUT_PhysicalPresence(TPM_SUCCESS)
ELSIF member(NOTPRESENT,p)
THEN s=state WITH [‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence:=FALSE] AND
a=OUT_PhysicalPresence(TPM_SUCCESS)
ELSE s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER) % Should be unreachable
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ENDIF
ELSE s=state AND a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_PARAMETER)
ENDIF;
TSC_ResetEstablishmentBit : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState): executeCom(s,ABS_ResetEstablishmentBit)),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_ResetEstablishmentBit)));
reset_establishment_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?)) :




ELSE a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_LOCALITY) AND s=state
ENDIF;
%% Seal and output a blob (should be binary or data)
TPM_Seal(k:(tpmKey?),pcrInfo:(tpmPCRInfoLong?),inData:tpmData) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState): outputCom(s,ABS_Seal(k,pcrInfo,inData)));
%% Seal a secret successfully
seal_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),k:(tpmKey?),p:(tpmPCRInfoLong?),d:tpmData) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_Seal(k,p,d))(state) IN
















%% Unseal and output a blob (should be binary or data)

























LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_Seal(k,p,d)













%% UnBind encrypted blob (decrypt)
TPM_UnBind(keyHandle:(tpmKey?),inData:(tpmBoundData?)) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState):outputCom(s,ABS_UnBind(keyHandle,inData)));
%% UnBind an encrypted blob successfully
unBind_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),k:(tpmKey?),d:(tpmBoundData?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_UnBind(k,d))(state) IN
LET d1=decrypt(private(k),d) IN








Tspi_Data_Bind(k:(tpmKey?),d:tpmData) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState): outputCom(s,ABS_Data_Bind(k,d)));
%% UnBind an encrypted blob successfully
unBind_prev_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),d:tpmData,p,k:(tpmKey?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(
Tspi_Data_Bind(k,d)






tpmBoundData?(d) AND unBind?(k) =>
a=OUT_UnBind(d,TPM_SUCCESS) AND
s=state;
%% Wrap new key k with parent key
TPM_CreateWrapKey(p,k:(tpmKey?)) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_CreateWrapKey(p,k))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_CreateWrapKey(p,k))));
create_wrap_key_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),p,k:(tpmKey?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_CreateWrapKey(p,k))(state) IN
IF not storage?(keyUsage(p))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF migratable(keyFlags(p)) AND not(migratable(keyFlags(k)))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF identity?(keyUsage(k)) or authChange?(keyUsage(k))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF migrateAuthority(keyFlags(k))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF state‘permFlags‘FIPS AND
(never?(authDataUsage(k)) OR legacy?(keyUsage(k)))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_NOTFIPS) AND s=state
ELSIF (storage?(keyUsage(k)) OR migrate?(keyUsage(k))) AND
not(RSA?(algoId(algoParms(k))))

























% A key is installed if it is wrapped with SRK
load_key_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),p,k:(tpmKey?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_LoadKey2(p,k))(state) IN
IF not storage?(keyUsage(p))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF wrappingKey(k)/=key(p)
THEN a=OUT_CPUError(CPU_DECRYPT_ERROR) AND s=state
ELSE CASES keyUsage(k) OF
identity: IF migratable(keyFlags(k))=FALSE
THEN IF migratable(keyFlags(k))=0 AND
migrationAuth(encDat(k))/=tpmProof(permData(state))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_FAIL) AND s=state
ELSIF FIPS(permFlags(state)) AND
(never?(authDataUsage(k)) OR legacy?(keyUsage(k)))









ELSE IF migratable(keyFlags(k))=0 AND
migrationAuth(encDat(k))/=tpmProof(permData(state))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_FAIL) AND s=state
ELSIF FIPS(permFlags(state)) AND (never?(authDataUsage(k)) OR
legacy?(keyUsage(k)))
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THEN s=state WITH [‘keys:=add(key(k),state‘keys)]
ELSIF member(key(p),state‘keys)
THEN s=state WITH [‘keys:=add(key(k),state‘keys)]
ELSE s=state
ENDIF




















LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_LoadKey2(p,k))(state) IN
not (loadKey2?(state,p,k)) =>
not (a=OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS));
%% A key is installed if it is wrapped with an installed key
%% proved - Tue Jun 12 15:38:22 CDT 2012
load_key_post3: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),p,j,k:(tpmKey?)) :









LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_CreateWrapKey(p,k)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)







createWrapKey?(p,k) AND loadKey2?(state,p,wrappedKey(s‘memory(x))) =>
a=OUT_LoadKey2(wrappedKey(s‘memory(x)),TPM_SUCCESS) AND
s=state WITH[‘keyGenCnt:=state‘keyGenCnt+1




































LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_CreateMigrationBlob(pk,m,mka,d))(state) IN
IF createMigBlob?(state,pk,m,mka,d)
























































LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_MigrateKey(mk,k,d))(state) IN
IF migrate?(keyUsage(mk))
THEN a = OUT_MigrateKey(encrypt(key(k),decrypt(key(mk),d)),TPM_SUCCESS)
ELSE a = OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE)
ENDIF
AND s=state;
%% Generate and output a signature
TPM_Sign(k:(tpmKey?),areaToSign:tpmData) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_Sign(k,areaToSign)));
sign_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),k:(tpmKey?),b:tpmData) :
LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_Sign(k,b))(state) IN
IF legacy?(keyUsage(k)) or signing?(keyUsage(k))
THEN a = OUT_Sign(sign(key(k),b),TPM_SUCCESS)
ELSE a = OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE)
ENDIF
AND s = state;
sign_pred_test : THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),k:(tpmKey?),b:tpmData) :
LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_Sign(k,b))(state) IN
IF sign?(state,k,b)
THEN a = OUT_Sign(sign(key(k),b),TPM_SUCCESS)
ELSE a = OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE)
ENDIF
AND s = state;
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(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_CreateRevocableEK(a,k,g,i))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_CreateRevocableEK(a,k,g,i))));
create_revocable_ek_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),a,i:(tpmNonce?),k:(tpmKey?),g:bool) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_CreateRevocableEK(a,k,g,i))(state) IN




s=state WITH [‘ek := privateKey(k)
,‘permFlags(CEKPUsed) := TRUE
,‘permFlags(enableRevokeEK) := TRUE





TPM_RevokeTrust(r:(tpmNonce?)) : State =
modifyOutput(
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : executeCom(s,ABS_RevokeTrust(r))),
(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_RevokeTrust(r))));
revoke_trust_post : THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),EKReset:(tpmNonce?)) :











THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_PERMANENTEK) AND s=state
ELSIF state‘permData‘ekReset/=EKReset
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_AUTHFAIL) AND s=state
ELSIF not s‘stclearFlags‘physicalPresence
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_BAD_MODE) AND s=state




LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_RevokeTrust(EKReset))(state) IN
not revokeTrust?(state,EKReset) =>
not a=OUT_Error(TPM_SUCCESS);
TPM_ReadPubek(n:(tpmNonce?)) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_ReadPubek(n)));
read_pub_ek_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),n:(tpmNonce?)) :
LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_ReadPubek(n))(state) IN
a=IF readPubek?(state,n)
























TPM_OwnerReadInternalPub(k:(tpmKey?)) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_OwnerReadInternalPub(k)));
owner_read_internal_pub_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),k:(tpmKey?)) :








%% Make a new identity and output it




















s=state WITH [‘keyGenCnt := keyGenCnt(state)+1]
ELSIF state‘permFlags‘FIPS AND never?(authDataUsage(k))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_NOTFIPS) AND s=state
ELSIF not identity?(keyUsage(k))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state
ELSIF migratable(keyFlags(k))
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE) AND s=state











LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_MakeIdentity(d,idk)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)















AND s=state WITH [‘keyGenCnt:=state‘keyGenCnt+2
,‘memory:=s‘memory];
%% Use an AIK








LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_ActivateIdentity(aik,blob))(state) IN
IF activateIdentity?(state,aik,blob)



































LET (a,s) = runState(
CA_certify(aik,c)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)





















LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_MakeIdentity(d,k)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)


































THEN IF state‘permFlags‘disable OR state‘stclearFlags‘deactivated





















%% Extend is antisymmetric if the hash values used for extension are
%% not equal. In this example we use the LET form to define
%% commands directly with monad functions defined in StateMonad.pvs
antisymmetryMonad: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),hv0,hv1:HV,n:PCRINDEX) :
LET f1:State = modify(OUT_Nothing,(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState):
s WITH [‘pcrs:=pcrsExtend(pcrs(s),n,hv0)])),
f2:State = modify(OUT_Nothing,(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState):
s WITH [‘pcrs:=pcrsExtend(pcrs(s),n,hv1)])) IN
hv0/=hv1 =>
runState(f2 >>= (LAMBDA (x:tpmAbsOutput): f1))(tpmStartup)
/=
runState(f1 >>= (LAMBDA (x:tpmAbsOutput): f2))(tpmStartup);
%% Extending a reset PCR is antisymmetric if the two values are not equal
%% Let form used to defined commands for bind. Will use command forms





extend?(state,n,hv0) AND extend?(state,n,hv1) AND
not(state‘stclearFlags‘deactivated OR state‘permFlags‘disable) AND





%% Extending a reset PCR is antisymmetric if the two values are not equal.
%% No let form - commands appear directly in bind
%% Theorem is now false when PCRs other than PCR0 are included.
antisymmetryMonad3: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),hv0,hv1:HV,n:PCRINDEX) :
extend?(state,n,hv0) AND extend?(state,n,hv1) AND
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not(state‘stclearFlags‘deactivated OR state‘permFlags‘disable) AND










TPM_PcrRead(i:PCRINDEX) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_PCRRead(i)));
pcr_read_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),i:PCRINDEX) :
LET(a,s) = runState(TPM_PcrRead(i))(state) IN





%% Generate and output a quote
TPM_Quote(k:(tpmKey?),n:(tpmNonce?),pm:PCR_SELECTION) : State =
output(LAMBDA (s:tpmAbsState) : outputCom(s,ABS_Quote(k,n,pm)));
%% If nonces don’t match, quotes don’t match. We don’t care about this
%% if the a quote cannot be produced.








%% Bad Signing Key - Man in the Middle Attack - we don’t care about this
%% if either key won’t produce a quote.
%% proved - Fri Jun 22 16:55:56 CDT 2012
bad_signing_key: THEOREM
FORALL (s:(afterStartup?),n:(tpmNonce?),pm:PCR_SELECTION,k0,k1:(tpmKey?)) :















%% Output after going through tpm commands is same as grabbing pcrs
%% proved - Fri Jun 22 16:56:08 CDT 2012
















%% Prove that quote generation returns the correct PCR. This theorem
%% needs to be updated with something cleaner.
%% proven - Wed Jul 11 10:40:28 EDT 2012
quote_post: THEOREM
FORALL (state:(afterStartup?),k:(tpmKey?),n:(tpmNonce?),p:PCR_SELECTION) :













LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_CreateWrapKey(pk,k)
>>=CPU_saveOutput(x)














%% Prove that skipping SENTER is detectable by showing the quote following
%% a command differs when SENTER is excluded.
























LET (a,s) = runState(TPM_PCR_Reset(select))(state) IN
IF null?(select)
THEN a=OUT_Error(TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO) AND s=state
ELSE LET num=validatePCRVals(state,select) IN
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COND
num=0 -> a=OUT_PCR_Reset(TPM_SUCCESS) AND
s=state WITH [‘pcrs:=pcrsResetSelection(state‘pcrs,select)],
num=1 -> a=OUT_Error(TPM_NOTRESETABLE) AND s=state,





























%% Data items that the TPM is aware of
tpmData : DATATYPE
BEGIN
%% Stub for migrateScheme so can take digest - createMigBlob (4.4)
tpmMigScheme(migScheme:migrateScheme) : tpmMigScheme?
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%% EK type- indicates what type of information the EK’s dealing with (4.11)
tpmEKBlobActivate(sessK:(tpmSessKey?),idDigest:(tpmDigest?),
pcrInfo:(tpmPCRInfoShort?)) : tpmEKBlobActivate?
%% Abitrarily long digest of arbitrary TPM data (5.4)
tpmDigest(digest:list[tpmData],crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmDigest?
% tpmDigest is the list of things concatenated and hashed to create the
% digest value - #(d0++d1++...++dn).
% Note that this digest does not contain PCRs
% TPM_COMPOSITE_HASH should be element of tpmDigest,
% PCR_COMPOSITE : [#select:PCR_SELECTION,pcrValue:PCRVALUES#]
tpmCompositeHash(dig:PCR_COMPOSITE) : tpmCompositeHash?
%% Random value that provides protection from replay. (5.5)
tpmNonce(i:int) : tpmNonce?
%% Authdata - don’t know what it is yet (5.6)
tpmSecret(i:int) : tpmSecret?
%% Provides proof that the associated public key has (5.12)
%% TPM Owner AuthData to be a migration key
tpmMigKeyAuth(key:(tpmKey?),scheme:(tpmMigScheme?),digest:(tpmDigest?),
crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmMigKeyAuth?
%% PCR Info (8.4)
tpmPCRInfoLong(
locAtCreation : LOCALITY %loc modifier when blob is created
% Loc modifier req to reveal sealed data or use a key wrapped to PCRs
% Value must not be zero (0)
, locAtRelease : LOCALITY
% Selection of PCRs active when blob is created
, creationPCRSelect : PCR_SELECTION
% Selection of PCRs to which the key or data is bound
, releasePCRSelect : PCR_SELECTION
% Composite digest value of the PCR values, when the blob is created
, digAtCreation : (tpmCompositeHash?)
% Digest of PCR indices and values to verify when revealing sealed data
% or using a key that was wrapped to PCRs




% Selection of PCRs that specifies the digestAtRelease
, locAtRelease : LOCALITY_SELECTION
% Locality modifier required to release information
% must not be zero (0)
, digAtRelease : (tpmCompositeHash?)
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% Digest of PCR indices and PCR values to verify when revealing auth data
) : tpmPCRInfoShort?
%% Stored Data - necessary to ensure the enforcement of security
%% properties (9.2) Used by seal and unseal commands to identify




%% encData is the piece encrypted by the crs.
%% Sealed Data - contains confidential info related to sealed data (9.3)
tpmSealedData(authData:(tpmSecret?),tpmProof:(tpmSecret?),
storedDigest:(tpmDigest?), data:tpmData,crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmSealedData?
%% Session keys are simply symetric keys (9.4)
tpmSessKey(skey:KVAL,crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmSessKey?
%% Bound data (9.5)
tpmBoundData(payloadData:tpmData,crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmBoundData?





% tpmKey subsumes all asymmetric keys used by the TPM
% encrypted key: tpmKey(k,...,encrypted(public(j),clear))
% clear key encrypted with public j
% signed/certified key: tpmKey(k,...,signed(private(j),clear))
% clear key signed by private j
%% Pub Key (10.5)
tpmPubkey(pubKey:KVAL):tpmPubkey?
%% Store Asym Key [private key] (10.6)
tpmStoreAsymkey(usageAuth:(tpmSecret?),migrationAuth:(tpmSecret?),
pubDataDigest:(tpmDigest?),privKey:KVAL,crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmStoreAsymkey?
%% Migrate Asym Key (10.8)
tpmMigrateAsymkey(usageAuth:(tpmSecret?),pubDataDigest:(tpmDigest?),
partPrivKey:KVAL) : tpmMigrateAsymkey?
%% Quote including a PCR digest and nonce. (11.3)
tpmQuote(digest:(tpmCompositeHash?),externalData:(tpmNonce?),
crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmQuote?
% PCRs are not current TPM data, so the digest is over PCR values.
%% Provides wrapper to each type of structure that will be in use when (12.1)
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%% EK is in use
tpmEKBlob(blob:tpmData,crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmEKBlob?
%% blob must be tpmEKBlobAuth or tpmEKBlobActivate
%% Certification request sent to Privacy CA (12.5)
tpmIdContents(digest:(tpmDigest?),aik:(tpmKey?),crs:CRYPTOSTATUS) : tpmIdContents?
% digest should contain CA public key, name, and AIK




























pcr [HV: TYPE+] : THEORY
BEGIN
%% Locality type - check with spec (8.6)
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LOCALITY : TYPE = n:nat | n<=4;
LOCALITY_SELECTION : TYPE = set[LOCALITY];
%% PCR array index type - check with spec
PCRINDEX : TYPE = n:nat | n <=23;
%% Should be bit map that indicates if a PCR is active or not. (8.1)







PCRVALUES : TYPE = ARRAY[PCRINDEX->PCR];
%% (8.2)
PCR_COMPOSITE : TYPE = [#
% The indication of which PCR values are active
select : PCR_SELECTION
% Array of PCRVALUE structures.
% The values come in the order specified by the select parameter
% and are concatenated into a single blob.
, pcrValue : PCRVALUES
#];
%% Information associated with PCR (8.8)
PCR_ATTRIBUTE : TYPE = [# pcrExtendLocal : LOCALITY_SELECTION
, pcrResetLocal : LOCALITY_SELECTION
, pcrReset : bool #];
%% PCR flag array
PCR_ATTRIBUTES : TYPE = ARRAY[PCRINDEX->PCR_ATTRIBUTE];




% Pcr attributes are available on a per PCR basis. Differs by platform configuration




, pcrResetLocal := allLocs
, pcrExtendLocal := allLocs
#))
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%% Some common PCR sets
%% Power on - unknown state
pcrsPower : PCRVALUES;
%% Following startup clear. Nonresettable PCRs to 0 and resettable PCRs to -1
pcrsReset(flags:PCR_ATTRIBUTES) : PCRVALUES =
(LAMBDA (i:PCRINDEX) :
IF pcrReset(flags(i)) THEN resetOne ELSE reset ENDIF);
%% Following SENTER. Nonresettable PCRs to same and resettable PCRs to 0
pcrsSenter(curr:PCRVALUES,flags:PCR_ATTRIBUTES) : PCRVALUES =
(LAMBDA (i:PCRINDEX) :
IF pcrReset(flags(i)) THEN reset ELSE curr(i) ENDIF);
pcrsResetSelection(curr:PCRVALUES,select:PCR_SELECTION) : PCRVALUES =
(LAMBDA (i:PCRINDEX) :




(LAMBDA (i:PCRINDEX) : IF member(i,pm) THEN reset ELSE pcrs(i) ENDIF)
%% Some common PCR flag settings
%% PCR extension operator
pcrsExtend(pcrs:PCRVALUES,i:PCRINDEX,hv:HV) : PCRVALUES =
(pcrs WITH [(i) := extend(pcrs(i),hv)])
getPCRs(pcrs:PCRVALUES,pcrMask:PCR_SELECTION) : list[PCR] =
map(pcrs,pcrMask);
getPCRsCorrectness: THEOREM





%% Extension is antisymmetric
antisym : THEOREM FORALL (h1,h2:HV, p:PCR) :
















key [DVAL,HVAL:TYPE+] : THEORY
BEGIN
IMPORTING data[DVAL,HVAL];
%% Reserved Key Handles - Should be moved to tpm.pvs









%% Not sure if EK is an indentity key or not




%% Any tpmKey? with key value 0 is invalid.
invalidKey?(k:(tpmKey?)):bool = key(k)=0;
%% Define private and public key accessors for tpmKey?. The public














%% Some theorems about key inverse, private and public.
%% The inverse key of the inverse key is the original key
double_inverse: THEOREM FORALL (k:KVAL) : inverse(inverse(k))=k;
%% the inverse of a private key is the public key for the same
%% asymmetric key.
inverse_private: THEOREM FORALL (k:(tpmKey?)) :
inverse(private(k))=public(k);
%% visa versa
inverse_public: THEOREM FORALL (k:(tpmKey?)) :
inverse(public(k))=private(k);
%% If inverse keys are equal, key values are equal
equal_inverse: THEOREM FORALL (k0,k1:KVAL) :
inverse(k0) = inverse(k1) <=> k0=k1;
%% Basic crypto functions operating on KVAL xStatus functions
%% operate on status indicators while x functions operate on
%% tpmData. Users need only call encrypt, decrypt, sign, checkSig
%% and friends.
% Data Encryption
encryptStatus(k:KVAL,c:CRYPTOSTATUS) : (encrypted?) =
encrypted(k,c);




































decryptStatus(k:KVAL,c:(encrypted?)) : CRYPTOSTATUS =
IF k = inverse(key(c)) THEN crstat(c) ELSE c ENDIF;

































































% Lemmas on decryption and encryption
decrypt_encrypt : THEOREM FORALL (k:KVAL,c:CRYPTOSTATUS) :
decryptStatus(inverse(k),encryptStatus(k,c)) = c;
decrypt_equal_keys: THEOREM FORALL (k0,k1:KVAL,b:CRYPTOSTATUS) :
k0=k1 IMPLIES decryptStatus(inverse(k1),encryptStatus(k0,b)) = b;
no_decrypt_unequal_keys: THEOREM FORALL (k0,k1:KVAL,b:CRYPTOSTATUS) :
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k0/=k1 IMPLIES decryptStatus(inverse(k1),encryptStatus(k0,b)) = encryptStatus(k0,b)
% Data signing
signStatus(k:KVAL,c:CRYPTOSTATUS) : (signed?) =
signed(k,c);


























% Data signature checking
checkSigStatus(k:KVAL,c:CRYPTOSTATUS) : bool =
CASES c OF
signed(kq,cq) : k = kq
ELSE FALSE
ENDCASES;


















% Lemmas on data signing and signature checking
check_sign : THEOREM FORALL (k:KVAL,c:CRYPTOSTATUS) :
checkSigStatus(k,signStatus(k,c));
%%%% Key sets, installation, and use
%% A keyset is a set of key values
KEYSET : TYPE = set[KVAL];
%% Is a key installed or the SRK?
installedOrSRK?(k:(tpmKey?),ks:KEYSET):bool =
member(key(k),ks) OR key(k)=key(TPM_KH_SRK);
%% There is no magic for SRK - use the TPM_KH_SRK handle if the wrapping
%% key is the SRK.
addKey(k:(tpmKey?),ks:KEYSET):KEYSET = add(key(k),ks);





















%% Remove a key - this is not currently
revokeKey(k:(tpmKey?),ks:KEYSET):KEYSET = remove(key(k),ks);
child_if_parent: THEOREM FORALL (k,wk:(tpmKey?),srk:KVAL,ks:KEYSET,d:PCRVALUES) : %d:list[PCR]
wrappingKey(k)=key(wk) AND storage?(keyUsage(wk))
% AND d=PCRInfo(k)
AND (member(wrappingKey(k),ks) OR wrappingKey(k)=key(TPM_KH_SRK))
=> member(key(k),loadKey(k,wk,ks,d))
no_child_if_no_parent: THEOREM FORALL (k:(tpmKey?),ks:KEYSET) :
NOT(member(key(k),revokeKey(k,ks)));
%% Crypto functions using TPM keys. Public keys from TPM keys are
%% public knowledge and require nothing for use - encrypt and
%% checkSig do not require a key set. Private keys must be
%% installed in the key set ks passed to each function - decrypt and
%% sign require a key set.
encryptWrapped(k:(tpmKey?),d:tpmData):tpmData = encrypt(key(k),d)
decryptWrapped(k:(tpmKey?),d:tpmData,ks:KEYSET):tpmData =
IF installedOrSRK?(k,ks) THEN decrypt(key(k),d) ELSE d ENDIF
signWrapped(k:(tpmKey?),d:tpmData,ks:KEYSET):tpmData =
IF installedOrSRK?(k,ks) THEN sign(key(k),d) ELSE d ENDIF
checkSigWrapped(k:(tpmKey?),d:tpmData):bool = checkSig(key(k),d)
END key















%% Keys are integers.
KVAL : TYPE = integer;
%% The inverse of a key its negation
inverse(k:KVAL):KVAL = -k;
%% The bad key value is 0
badkey:KVAL = 0;
goodkey?(key:KVAL) : bool =
key/=badkey












%% Flags for defining key properties (5.10)
KEY_FLAGS : TYPE = [#redirection : bool
, migratable : bool
, isVolatile : bool
, pcrIgnoredOnRead : bool
, migrateAuthority : bool
#];
%% All key flags false
keyFlagsF : KEY_FLAGS = (#redirection:= FALSE
, migratable := FALSE
, isVolatile := FALSE
, pcrIgnoredOnRead := FALSE










KEY_PARMS : TYPE = [#algoId : ALGO_ID
% , encScheme :
% , sigScheme :
% , parms :
#];
keyParmsDef : KEY_PARMS = (#algoId:=RSA#)






%% Type indicating crypographic status - clear, encrypted, signed, wrapped,




























%% return :: a -> M a -- Nothing special here
%%
%% x - output produced in the state
%% s - the state being associated with x
%%
%% 1. x is bound to a new output of type A
%% 2. state encapsulates a function of type S->[A,S]
%% 3. the value for A in runState is x, the input to return
%% 4. the value for S is held abstract until runState is applied
%% 5. whatever state is input to runState, the output will be the value
%% bound to x in return(x)
return(x:A):State = state(LAMBDA (s:S) : (x,s));
%% bind :: M a -> (a -> M b) -> M b -- For our purposes a=b making this
%% bind :: M a -> (a -> M a) -> M a
%%
%% m - State[A,S] - a runState function
%% f - [A->State[A,S]] - takes an A to a State[A,S]
%%
%% 1. LET cases the runState function to be extracted from m and calls it on
%% s0 resulting in a value of type [A,S]. s0 is the input state
%% 2. a is bound to the A element and s1 to the S element. Thus, a is the
%% resulting output and s1 is the resulting state
%% 3. f transforms A into a State[A,S] containing a function of type S->[A,S]
%% 4. runState extracts the function and applies it to s1, the state resulting








LET (a,s1) = runState(m)(s0) IN
runState(s)(s1));
%% Monad laws -- might as well, we’re in a prover
% Left identity -- bind(return(a),f) = f(a)
left_identity: LAW FORALL (a:A,f:[A->State]) : return(a) >>= f = f(a)
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% Right identity -- bind(m,return) = m
right_identity: LAW FORALL (m:State) : m >>= return = m
% Associativity -- bind(bind(m,f),g) = bind(m,bind(lambda:x->f(x),g))
assocativity: LAW FORALL (m:State,f,g:[A->State]) :
m >>= f >>= g = m >>= (lambda(x:A): f(x) >>= g)
%% Common Monadic functions
%% liftM lifts a state transformation into the state monad. Given a function




LET (a1,s1) = runState(m0)(s0) IN
(a1,f(s1))));
%% ifM takes a predicate and a condition monad, evaluates the condition
%% monad and calls the predicate on the output. Based on the predicate
%% value, one of two monads results. ifM_ works the same, but ignores
%% the prior output.
%% Use with >>=
ifM(p:[A->bool],c,t,e:[A->State]): [A->State] =
(LAMBDA (a:A) : c(a) >>= IF p(a) THEN t ELSE e ENDIF);
%% Use with >>
ifM_(p:[A->bool],c:State,t,e:[A->State]): State =
c >>= (LAMBDA (a:A): IF p(a) THEN t(a) ELSE e(a) ENDIF);
%% Predefined, useful values for f.
% Replace state
put(a:A,s1:S) : State = state(LAMBDA(s0:S):(a,s1))
% Modify state using only the current state
modify(a:A,f:[S->S]) : State = state(LAMBDA(s0:S):(a,f(s0)))
% Generate output with no state modification
output(g:[S->A]) : State = state(LAMBDA(s0:S):(g(s0),s0))
% Modify state and generate output
modifyOutput(f:[S->S],g:[S->A]) : State =
state(LAMBDA(s0:S):(g(s0),f(s0)))
% Modify state with previous output and current state.
useOutputState(f:[A->[S->S]]) : [A->State] =
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(LAMBDA (a:A):state(LAMBDA(s0:S):(a,f(a)(s0))))
% Generate output with previous output and current state.
useOutputOutput(f:[A->[S->A]]) : [A->State] =
(LAMBDA (a:A):state(LAMBDA(s0:S):(f(a)(s0),s0)))
% Generate an entire new state with previous output and current state.





















mem : TYPE = [nat -> C];
%% initial empty memory
empty : mem = (LAMBDA (i:nat) : e);
%% update a memory location
updateLoc(m:mem,i:nat,v:C):mem =
(LAMBDA (x:nat) : IF x=i THEN v ELSE m(x) ENDIF);
%% empty contains nothing
empty_empty: THEOREM FORALL (x:nat) : empty(x)=e;
%% Updated memory returns the right value for the udpated location
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update1: THEOREM FORALL (m:mem,i:nat,c:C) :
(updateLoc(m,i,c)(i)=c);
%% Updated memoery returns the old value for everyting except the updated
%% location
update2: THEOREM FORALL (m:mem,i,j:nat,c:C) :
i/=j => updateLoc(m,i,c)(j)=m(j);
END memory







































%% Record containing state data to be stored on TPM_SaveState invocation
%% and restored when using TPM_ST_STATE flag. The valid? flag indicates
%% if whether the record is valid or not. Note that EK and SRK should
%% technically be in the permData structure, but we like to keep those
%% values exposed at the TPM state level. Most presentations of the TPM
%% do this and do not reference permData or permFlags. Thus, we try
%% to be consistent here.














wellFormedRestore?(r:restoreStateData) : bool =
valid?(r) =>
FORALL (i:PCRINDEX) :
pcrReset(pcrAttrib(permData(r))(i)) => pcrs(r)(i) = resetOne;
%% Create a save record with keys, pcrs, and pcr flags. Throw out pcr











tpmStclearData: StclearData ) : (wellFormedRestore?) =


















%% Initial value for saved data. The only field that matters is the valid?




initSaveData : (wellFormedRestore?) =














7.9 Permanent Data Theory
%% ----
%%
%% Permanent Data Theory
%%
%% Description:
%% This structure contains the data fields that are permanently held in the TPM












PermData : TYPE = [#
%% This is a random number that each TPM maintains to validate blobs in the
%% SEAL and other processes. THe default value is manufacturer specific.
tpmProof : (tpmSecret?)
%%
, ekReset : (tpmNonce?)
%% This is the TPM-Owner’s AuthData data. default is manufacturer-specific.
, ownerAuth : (tpmSecret?)
%% The value that allows the execution of the TPM_SetTempDeactivated command
, operatorAuth : (tpmSecret?)
%% PCR attributes set during manufacturing for specific register, the
%% attributes must match requirements of the TCG platform specific
%% specification that describes the platform.









, pcrAttrib := allResetAccess
#)
END PermanentData
7.10 Permanent Flags Theory
%% ----
%%




%% These flags maintain state information for the TPM. The values are not








PermFlags : TYPE = [#
% The state of the disable flag. The default state is TRUE
disable : bool
% The ability to install an owner. The default state is TRUE
, ownership : bool
% The state of the inactive flag. The default state is TRUE
, deactivated : bool
% The ability to read the PUBEK without owner AuthData. default TRUE.
, readPubek : bool
% Whether the owner authorized clear commands are active. default FALSE.
, disableOwnerClear : bool
% Whether the TPM Owner may create a maintenance archive. default TRUE if
% maintenance is implemented, vendor specific if maintenance is not
% implemented.
, allowMaintenance : bool
% This bit can only be set to TRUE; it cannot be set to FALSE except during
% the manufacturing process.
% FALSE: The state of either physicalPresenceHWEnable or
% physicalPresenceCMDEnable MAY be changed. (DEFAULT)
% TRUE: The state of either physicalPresenceHWEnable or
% physicalPresenceCMDEnable MUST NOT be changed for the life of the TPM.
, physicalPresenceLifetimeLock : bool
% FALSE: Disable the hardware signal indicating physical presence. (DEFAULT)
% TRUE: Enables the hardware signal indicating physical presence.
, physicalPresenceHWEnable : bool
% FALSE: Disable the command indicating physical presence. (DEFAULT)
% TRUE: Enables the command indicating physical presence.
, physicalPresenceCMDEnable : bool
% TRUE: The PRIVEK and PUBEK were created using TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair
% FALSE: The PRIVEK and PUBEK were created using a manufacturer’s process.
% NOTE: This flag has no default value as the key pair MUST be created by
% one or the other mechanism.
, CEKPUsed : bool
% TRUE: This TPM operates in FIPS mode
% FALSE: This TPM does NOT operate in FIPS mode
, FIPS : bool
% TRUE: The operator AuthData value is valid
% FALSE: the operator AuthData value is not set (DEFAULT)
, operator : bool
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% TRUE: The TPM_RevokeTrust command is active
% FALSE: the TPM RevokeTrust command is disabled
, enableRevokeEK : bool
% TRUE: All NV area authorization checks are active
% FALSE: No NV area checks are performed, except for maxNVWrites. (DEFAULT)
, nvLocked : bool
% TRUE: GetPubKey will return the SRK pub key
% FALSE: GetPubKey will not return the SRK pub key Default SHOULD be FALSE.
% See the informative.
, readSRKPub : bool
% TRUE: TPM_HASH_START has been executed at some time
% FALSE: TPM_HASH_START has not been executed at any time (DEFAULT)
% Reset to FALSE using TSC_ResetEstablishmentBit
, tpmEstablished : bool
% TRUE: A maintenance archive has been created for the current SRK
, maintenanceDone : bool
% TRUE: The full dictionary attack TPM_GetCapability info is deactivated.
% The returned structure is TPM_DA_INFO_LIMITED.
% FALSE: The full dictionary attack TPM_GetCapability info is activated.
% The returned structure is TPM_DA_INFO. (DEFAULT)










































7.11 Stany Data Theory
%% ----
%%
%% STANY Data Theory
%%
%% Description: Most of the data in this structure resets on
%% TPM_Startup(ST_STATE). A TPM may implement rules that provide longer-term
%% persistence for the data. The TPM reflects how it handles the data in












StanyData : TYPE = [#
% The nonce used to properly identify saved session context blobs.
% This MUST be set to all zeros on each TPM_Startup (ST_Clear).
% The nonce MAY be set to all zeros on TPM_Startup(any).
% Flag Name : TPM_AD_CONTEXTNONCESESSION
contextNonceSession : (tpmNonce?)
% This is the counter to avoid session context blob replay attacks.
% This MUST be set to 0 on each TPM_Startup (ST_Clear). The value MAY
% be set to 0 on TPM_Startup (any).
% Flag Name : TPM_AD_CONTEXTCOUNT
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, contextCount : int
% This is the list of outstanding session blobs.
% All elements of this array MUST be set to 0 on each
% TPM_Startup(ST_Clear). The values MAY be set to 0 on
% TPM_Startup(any). TPM_MIN_SESSION_LIST MUST be 16 or greater.
% Flag Name : TPM_AD_CONTEXTLIST
, contextList : int
#];






7.12 Stany Flags Theory
%% ----
%%
%% STANY Flags Theory
%%
%% Description:
%% These flags reset on any TPM_Startup command. postInitialize indicates only
%% that TPM_Startup has run, not that it was successful
%% TOSPresent indicates the presence of a Trusted Operating System (TOS) that









StanyFlags : TYPE = [#
% Prevents the operation of most capabilities. There is no default
% state. Initialized by TPM_Init to TRUE.TPM_Startup sets it to FALSE
postInitialize : bool
% This SHALL indicate for each command the presence of a locality
% modifier for the command. It MUST be always ensured that the value
% during usage reflects the current active locality.
, localityModifier : LOCALITY
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% Defaults to FALSE
% TRUE when there is an exclusive transport session active. Execution
% of ANY command other than TPM_ExecuteTransport targeting the
% exclusive transport session MUST invalidate the exclusive
% transport session.
, transportExclusive : bool
% Defaults to FALSE
% Set to TRUE on TPM_HASH_START set to FALSE using setCapability
, TOSPresent : bool
#];
stanyFlagsInit : StanyFlags =
(# postInitialize:=FALSE,





7.13 Stclear Data Theory
%% ----
%%
%% STCLEAR Data Theory
%%
%% Description:
%% Most of the data in this structure resets on TPM_Startup(ST_CLEAR). A TPM
%% may implement rules that provide longer-term persistence for the data. The
%% TPM reflects how it handles the data in various TPM_GetCapablity fields













StclearData : TYPE = [#
% This is the nonce in use to properly identify saved key context blobs.
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% This SHALL be set to all zeros on each TPM_Startup (ST_Clear).
contextNonceKey : (tpmNonce?)
% Points to where to obtain the owner secret in OIAP and OSAP
% commands. This allows a TSS to manage 1.1 applications on a 1.2
% TPM where delegation is in operation.
% Default value is TPM_KH_OWNER.
, ownerReference : int
% Disables TPM_ResetLockValue upon authorization failure. The value
% remains TRUE for the timeout period. Default FALSE.
% The value is in the STCLEAR_DATA structure as the implementation of
% this flag is TPM vendor specific.
, disableResetLock : bool
% Platform configuration registers
, PCR : PCRVALUES
% The value can save the assertion of physicalPresence. Individual
% bits indicate to its ordinal that physicalPresence was previously
% asserted when the software state is such that it can no longer be
% asserted.
% Set to zero on each TPM_Startup(ST_Clear).
, deferredPhysicalPresence : int
#];








7.14 Stclear Flags Theory
%% ----
%%
%% STCLEAR Flags Theory
%%
%% Description:
%% These flags maintain state that is reset on teach TPM_Startup(ST_CLEAR)









StclearFlags : TYPE = [#
% Prevents the operation of most capabilities. There is no default
% state. It is initialized by TPM_Startup to the same value as
% TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS->deactivated or a set value depending on the
% type of TPM_Startup. TPM_SetTempDeactivated sets it to TRUE.
deactivated : bool
% Prevents the operation of TPM_ForceClear when TRUE. default FALSE.
% TPM_DisableForceClear sets it to TRUE.
, disableForceClear : bool
% Command assertion of physical presence. default FALSE.
% This flag is affected by the TSC_PhysicalPresence command but not
% by the hardware signal.
, physicalPresence : bool
% Indicates whether changes to TPM_STCLEAR_FLAGS->physicalPresence
% flag are permitted.
% TPM_Startup(ST_CLEAR) sets PhysicalPresenceLock to default (FALSE)
% (allow changes to the physicalPresence flag).
% When TRUE, the physicalPresence flag is FALSE.
% TSC_PhysicalPresence can change the state of physicalPresenceLock.
, physicalPresenceLock : bool
% Set to FALSE on each TPM_Startup(ST_CLEAR). Set to TRUE when a
% write to NV_Index=0 is successful.
, bGlobablLock : bool
#];








7.15 Return Codes Theory
%% ----
%%
%% Return Codes Theory
%%

















% The index to a PCR, DIR or other register is incorrect
TPM_BADINDEX : TPM_BADINDEX?
% One or more parameter is bad
TPM_BAD_PARAMETER : TPM_BAD_PARAMETER?
% Operation completed successfully but the auditing of that operation failed
TPM_AUDITFAILURE : TPM_AUDITFAILURE?
% The clear disable flag is set and all clear operations now require
% physical access.
TPM_CLEAR_DISABLED : TPM_CLEAR_DISABLED?
% The TPM is deactivated
TPM_DEACTIVATED : TPM_DEACTIVATED?
% The TPM is disabled
TPM_DISABLED : TPM_DISABLED?
% The target command has been disabled
TPM_DISABLED_CMD : TPM_DISABLED_CMD?
% The operation failed
TPM_FAIL : TPM_FAIL?
% The ordinal was unknown or inconsistent
TPM_BAD_ORDINAL : TPM_BAD_ORDINAL?
% The ability to install an owner is disabled
TPM_INSTALL_DISABLED : TPM_INSTALL_DISABLED?
% The key handle presented was invalid
TPM_INVALID_KEYHANDLE : TPM_INVALID_KEYHANDLE?
% The target key was not found
TPM_KEYNOTFOUND : TPM_KEYNOTFOUND?
% Unacceptable encryption scheme
TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_ENC : TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_ENC?
% Migration authorization failed
TPM_MIGRATEFAIL : TPM_MIGRATEFAIL?
% PCR information could not be interpreted
TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO : TPM_INVALID_PCR_INFO?
% No room to load key.
TPM_NOSPACE : TPM_NOSPACE?
% There is no SRK set
TPM_NOSRK : TPM_NOSRK?
% An encrypted blob is invalid or was not created by this TPM
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TPM_NOTSEALED_BLOB : TPM_NOTSEALED_BLOB?
% There is already an Owner
TPM_OWNER_SET : TPM_OWNER_SET?
% TPM has insufficient internal resources to perform the requested action.
TPM_RESOURCES : TPM_RESOURCES?
% A random string was too short
TPM_SHORTRANDOM : TPM_SHORTRANDOM?
% The TPM does not have the space to perform the operation.
TPM_SIZE : TPM_SIZE?
% The named PCR value does not match the current PCR value.
TPM_WRONGPCRVAL : TPM_WRONGPCRVAL?
% The paramSize argument to the command has the incorrect value
TPM_BAD_PARAM_SIZE : TPM_BAD_PARAM_SIZE?
% There is no existing SHA-1 thread.
TPM_SHA_THREAD : TPM_SHA_THREAD?
% The calculation is unable to proceed because the existing SHA-1 thread has
% already encountered an error.
TPM_SHA_ERROR : TPM_SHA_ERROR?
% Self-test has failed and the TPM has shutdown.
TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST : TPM_FAILEDSELFTEST?
% The authorization for the 2nd key in a 2 key function failed authorization
TPM_AUTH2FAIL : TPM_AUTH2FAIL?
% The tag value sent to for a command is invalid
TPM_BADTAG : TPM_BADTAG?
% An IO error occurred transmitting information to the TPM
TPM_IOERROR : TPM_IOERROR?
% The encryption process had a problem.
TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR : TPM_ENCRYPT_ERROR?
% The decryption process did not complete.
TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR : TPM_DECRYPT_ERROR?
% An invalid handle was used.
TPM_INVALID_AUTHHANDLE : TPM_INVALID_AUTHHANDLE?
% The TPM does not a EK installed
TPM_NO_ENDORSEMENT : TPM_NO_ENDORSEMENT?
% The usage of a key is not allowed
TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE : TPM_INVALID_KEYUSAGE?
% The submitted entity type is not allowed
TPM_WRONG_ENTITYTYPE : TPM_WRONG_ENTITYTYPE?
% The command was received in the wrong sequence relative to TPM_Init and a
% subsequent TPM_Startup
TPM_INVALID_POSTINIT : TPM_INVALID_POSTINIT?
% Signed data cannot include additional DER information
TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_SIG : TPM_INAPPROPRIATE_SIG?
% The key properties in TPM_KEY_PARMs are not supported by this TPM
TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY : TPM_BAD_KEY_PROPERTY?
% The migration properties of this key are incorrect.
TPM_BAD_MIGRATION : TPM_BAD_MIGRATION?
% The signature or encryption scheme for this key is incorrect or not
% permitted in this situation.
TPM_BAD_SCHEME : TPM_BAD_SCHEME?
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% The size of the data (or blob) parameter is bad or inconsistent with the
% referenced key
TPM_BAD_DATASIZE : TPM_BAD_DATASIZE?
% A mode parameter is bad, such as capArea or subCapArea for
% TPM_GetCapability, physicalPresence parameter for TPM_PhysicalPresence,
% or migrationType for TPM_CreateMigrationBlob.
TPM_BAD_MODE : TPM_BAD_MODE?
% Either physicalPresence or physicalPresenceLock bits have the wrong value
TPM_BAD_PRESENCE : TPM_BAD_PRESENCE?
% The TPM cannot perform this version of the capability
TPM_BAD_VERSION : TPM_BAD_VERSION?
% The TPM does not allow for wrapped transport sessions
TPM_NO_WRAP_TRANSPORT : TPM_NO_WRAP_TRANSPORT?
% TPM audit construction failed and the underlying command was returning a
% failure code also
TPM_AUDITFAIL_UNSUCCESSFUL : TPM_AUDITFAIL_UNSUCCESSFUL?
% audit construction failed and the underlying command was returning success
TPM_AUDITFAIL_SUCCESSFUL : TPM_AUDITFAIL_SUCCESSFUL?
% Attempt to reset a PCR register that does not have resettable attribute
TPM_NOTRESETABLE : TPM_NOTRESETABLE?
% Attempt to reset a PCR register that requires locality and locality
% modifier not part of command transport
TPM_NOTLOCAL : TPM_NOTLOCAL?
% Make identity blob not properly typed
TPM_BAD_TYPE : TPM_BAD_TYPE?
% When saving context identified resource type doesn’t match actual resource
TPM_INVALID_RESOURCE : TPM_INVALID_RESOURCE?
% The TPM attempting to execute a command only available when in FIPS mode
TPM_NOTFIPS : TPM_NOTFIPS?
% The command is attempting to use an invalid family ID
TPM_INVALID_FAMILY : TPM_INVALID_FAMILY?
% The permission to manipulate the NV storage is not available
TPM_NO_NV_PERMISSION : TPM_NO_NV_PERMISSION?
% The operation requires a signed command
TPM_REQUIRES_SIGN : TPM_REQUIRES_SIGN?
% Wrong operation to load an NV key
TPM_KEY_NOTSUPPORTED : TPM_KEY_NOTSUPPORTED?
% NV_LoadKey blob requires both owner and blob authorization
TPM_AUTH_CONFLICT : TPM_AUTH_CONFLICT?
% The NV area is locked and not writable
TPM_AREA_LOCKED : TPM_AREA_LOCKED?
% The locality is incorrect for the attempted operation
TPM_BAD_LOCALITY : TPM_BAD_LOCALITY?
% The NV area is read only and can’t be written to
TPM_READ_ONLY : TPM_READ_ONLY?
% There is no protection on the write to the NV area
TPM_PER_NOWRITE : TPM_PER_NOWRITE?
% The family count value does not match
TPM_FAMILYCOUNT : TPM_FAMILYCOUNT?
% The NV area has already been written to
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TPM_WRITE_LOCKED : TPM_WRITE_LOCKED?
% The NV area attributes conflict
TPM_BAD_ATTRIBUTES : TPM_BAD_ATTRIBUTES?
% The structure tag and version are invalid or inconsistent
TPM_INVALID_STRUCTURE : TPM_INVALID_STRUCTURE?
% The key is under control of TPM Owner and can only be evicted by TPM Owner
TPM_KEY_OWNER_CONTROL : TPM_KEY_OWNER_CONTROL?
% The counter handle is incorrect
TPM_BAD_COUNTER : TPM_BAD_COUNTER?
% The write is not a complete write of the area
TPM_NOT_FULLWRITE : TPM_NOT_FULLWRITE?
% The gap between saved context counts is too large
TPM_CONTEXT_GAP : TPM_CONTEXT_GAP?
% The maximum number of NV writes without an owner has been exceeded
TPM_MAXNVWRITES : TPM_MAXNVWRITES?
% No operator authorization value is set
TPM_NOOPERATOR : TPM_NOOPERATOR?
% The resource pointed to by context is not loaded
TPM_RESOURCEMISSING : TPM_RESOURCEMISSING?
% The delegate administration is locked
TPM_DELEGATE_LOCK : TPM_DELEGATE_LOCK?
% Attempt to manage a family other then the delegated family
TPM_DELEGATE_FAMILY : TPM_DELEGATE_FAMILY?
% Delegation table management not enabled
TPM_DELEGATE_ADMIN : TPM_DELEGATE_ADMIN?
% There was a command executed outside of an exclusive transport session
TPM_TRANSPORT_NOTEXCLUSIVE : TPM_TRANSPORT_NOTEXCLUSIVE?
% Attempt to context save a owner evict controlled key
TPM_OWNER_CONTROL : TPM_OWNER_CONTROL?
% The DAA command has no resources available to execute the command
TPM_DAA_RESOURCES : TPM_DAA_RESOURCES?
% The consistency check on DAA parameter inputData0 has failed.
TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA0 : TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA0?
% The consistency check on DAA parameter inputData1 has failed.
TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA1 : TPM_DAA_INPUT_DATA1?
% The consistency check on DAA_issuerSettings has failed.
TPM_DAA_ISSUER_SETTINGS : TPM_DAA_ISSUER_SETTINGS?
% The consistency check on DAA_tpmSpecific has failed.
TPM_DAA_TPM_SETTINGS : TPM_DAA_TPM_SETTINGS?
% The atomic process indicated by the submitted DAA command is not the
% expected process.
TPM_DAA_STAGE : TPM_DAA_STAGE?
% The issuer’s validity check has detected an inconsistency
TPM_DAA_ISSUER_VALIDITY : TPM_DAA_ISSUER_VALIDITY?
% The consistency check on w has failed.
TPM_DAA_WRONG_W : TPM_DAA_WRONG_W?
% The handle is incorrect
TPM_BAD_HANDLE : TPM_BAD_HANDLE?
% Delegation is not correct
TPM_BAD_DELEGATE : TPM_BAD_DELEGATE?
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% The context blob is invalid
TPM_BADCONTEXT : TPM_BADCONTEXT?
% Too many contexts held by the TPM
TPM_TOOMANYCONTEXTS : TPM_TOOMANYCONTEXTS?
% Migration authority signature validation failure
TPM_MA_TICKET_SIGNATURE : TPM_MA_TICKET_SIGNATURE?
% Migration destination not authenticated
TPM_MA_DESTINATION : TPM_MA_DESTINATION?
% Migration source incorrect
TPM_MA_SOURCE : TPM_MA_SOURCE?
% Incorrect migration authority
TPM_MA_AUTHORITY : TPM_MA_AUTHORITY?
% Attempt to revoke the EK and the EK is not revocable
TPM_PERMANENTEK : TPM_PERMANENTEK?
% Bad signature of CMK ticket
TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE : TPM_BAD_SIGNATURE?
% There is no room in the context list for additional contexts
TPM_NOCONTEXTSPACE : TPM_NOCONTEXTSPACE?
%% TPM_NON_FATAL
% The TPM is too busy to respond to the command immediately, but the
% command could be submitted at a later time
TPM_RETRY : TPM_RETRY?
% TPM_ContinueSelfTest has has not been run
TPM_NEEDS_SELFTEST : TPM_NEEDS_SELFTEST?
% The TPM is currently executing the actions of TPM_ContinueSelfTest because
% the ordinal required resources that have not been tested.
TPM_DOING_SELFTEST : TPM_DOING_SELFTEST?











7.16 CA Protocol Theory
%% Verification of the quote generation process from init through
%% generation of a appraiser’s quote.
%%
%% Acronym map:
%% MLE - Measured Launch Environment
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%% TSS - Trusted Software Stack
%% CR - Certification Request
%% CA - Certificate Authority used to sign AIKs
%%
%% Memory map:
%% 0 -> identity
%% 1 -> CA cert
%% 2 -> TPM quote
%%
caProtocol [ B:TYPE+ % BLOB
, HV:TYPE+ % Hash value




























LET (a,s) = runState(
% At this piont, the TSS holds an activation record
% encrypted by an EK. If it is encrypted with its TPM’s EK
% it can decrypt the signed AIK and session key. The
% ActivateIdentity command does this. Note that that is all
% ActivateIdentity does. Nothing is installed and the TPM
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% state is not modified in any way.
% >>= (LAMBDA (a:tpmAbsOutput) :
% CASES a OF
% % outIdentActivation(actc,sk,actek,rc) : TPM_ActivateIdentity(wkey(actc),k)





% Only the correct TPM can decrypt the certificate
% and session key. This is critical as it links the
% certificate and session key to the TPM. Now the TPM
% generates a quote signed by the AIK using the Quote
% command.





>>= CPU_saveOutput(2) % Quote is saved in 2 Now the
% TSS is ready to build the appraiser’s quote. It
% has the generated TPM quote signed by the AIK
% that only the TPM can generate. It has the
% certificate from the CA that only the TPM could
% decrypt. It now ships the certificate and the quote
% back to the appraiser
>> CPU_BuildQuoteFromMem(2,0) % Build the quote
)
% When the appraiser recieves the quote, it can check the
% AIK signature and the AIK cert to ensure that the TPM
% quote came from a legitimate TPM associated with the AIK.
% However, it cannot collude with other appraisers to
% learn more about the target as they all can use different
% AIK values.
(makeCertActivate(state,idKey,caDig)) IN
% The start state here is the resulting state from running
% TPM_MakeIdentity(d,k) >>= CPU_saveOutput(x) >>= CA_certify(k,i)
% >>= CPU_saveOutput(y) >>= TPM_ActivateIdentity(j,d)











% The protocol works if the object being output is what we believe
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LET (a,s) = runState(
TPM_MakeIdentity(d,k)
>>= CPU_saveOutput(x)































































invariants [ B:TYPE+ % BLOB
, HV:TYPE+ % Hash value
































not(ABS_Startup?(c) or ABS_Init?(c) OR












% 1. The TPM SHALL only allow the following commands to alter the value














%% Monotonicity of locality
%% Assuming that we’re not resetting or powering on, locality goes down
%% or remains the same
%% proved - Fri Sep 21 15:07:30 CDT 2012
monotonic_locality: THEOREM
FORALL (s:tpmAbsState,c:tpmAbsInput) :










































































































































































































not(ABS_Startup?(c) or ABS_Init?(c) OR

















not(ABS_Startup?(c) or ABS_Init?(c) OR













not(ABS_Startup?(c) OR ABS_Init?(c) OR
ABS_DisableForceClear?(c)) =>
s‘stclearFlags‘disableForceClear =
disableForceClear(stclearFlags(executeCom(s,c)));
END invariants
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